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A CLEAN HEART AND AN EMPTY HEAD:*
THE SUPREME COURT AND SEXUAL
TERRORISM IN PRISON
JAMES E. ROBERTSON**
Stepping into the darkened cell, he was swept into a whirlwind of
violent movement that flung him hard against the wall, knocking
the wind from him. A rough, callused hand encircled his throat,
the fingers digging painfully into his neck, cutting off the scream
rushing to his lips. "Holler, whore, and you die," a hoarse voice
warned, the threat emphasized by the knife point at his throat ....
He was thrown on the floor, his pants pulled off him. As a hand
profanely squeezed his buttocks, he felt a flush of embarrassment
and anger. more because of his basic weakness-which prevented
him from doing anything to stop what was happening-than
because of what was actually going on. His throat grunted painful
noises, an awful pleading whine that went ignored as he felt his
buttocks spread roughly apart. A searing pain raced through his
body as the hardness of one of his attackers tore roughly into his
rectum.... A sense of helplessness overwhelmed him and he
began to cry, and even after the last penis was pulled out of his
abused bleeding body, he still cried, overwhelmed by the
knowledge that it was not over, that this was only the beginning of
a nightmare that would only end with violence, death, or release
from prison.'
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INTRODUCTION
A commentator recently characterized male rape as the "most
closely guarded secret activity of America's prisons."2  This
proposition belies many facts of prison life: sexual assault victims
have brought numerous civil rights actions since the demise of the
hands-off doctrine;3 commentators have produced a large body of
2. Brian Saccenti, Preventing Summary Judgment Against Inmates Who Have Been
Sexually Assaulted by Showing that the Risk Was Obvious, 59 MD. L. REV. 642, 642 n.4
(2000) (quoting CARL WEISS & DAVID JAMES FRIAR, TERROR IN THE PRISONS, at x
(1974)). Other commentators have spoken of this supposed "secret." See, e.g., Sarah E.
Frink, Aids Behind Bars: Judicial Barriers to Prisoners' Constitutional Claims, 5 DRAKE
L. REV. 527, 542 (1997) (quoting WEISS & FRIAR, supra, at x); David M. Siegal, Rape in
Prison and AIDS: A Challenge for the Eighth Amendment Framework of Wilson v. Seiter,
44 STAN. L. REV. 1541, 1544 (1992) (quoting WEISS & FRIAR, supra, at x); Richard D.
Vetstein, Rape and AIDS in Prison: On a Collision Course to a New Death Penalty, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 863, 868 (1997) (quoting WEISS & FRIAR, supra, at x).
3. See infra notes 124-332 and accompanying text (discussing the case law of the
deliberate indifference test as it applies to prison rape). The hands-off doctrine
constituted a "judicial policy of non-intervention in prison practices and conditions except
in the most egregious instances." See James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead:
Warehouse Prisons, Paradigm Change, and the Supreme Court, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1003,
1039 (1997); see also, e.g., Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505-06 (10th Cir. 1969) ("We
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scholarly work on the subject;' the media has sporadically "exposed"
the secret;5 and Human Rights Watch has advanced a host of
measures for safeguarding inmates from rape.6
have consistently adhered to the so-called 'hands-off' policy .... ); Sarshik v. Sanford, 142
F.2d 676, 676 (10th Cir. 1944) ("The courts have no function to superintend the treatment
of prisoners in the penitentiary, but only to deliver from prison those who are illegally
detained there."); United States ex rel. Yaris v. Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp. 143, 144
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) ("[I]t is unthinkable that the judiciary should take over the operation of
... prisons."); Martin W. Spector, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing
Law, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 985, 986-87 (1962) ("[CJourts have been so influenced by the
dogma of the independence of prison authorities that judicial intervention has been
limited to the extreme situation."); Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of
Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 507 (1963)
(noting that except on rare occasions courts followed the "hands-off" doctrine, leaving
prisoners "without enforceable rights").
4. See, e.g., No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report.html (last visited Nov.
17, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH] (stating that the organization conducts regular, systematic investigations of
human rights abuses around the world); DANIEL LOCKWOOD, PRISON SEXUAL
VIOLENCE 18 (1980) (describing a 1975 survey study on prison sexual assault); PETER L.
NACCI & THOMAS R. KANE, SEX AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION IN FEDERAL PRISONS 15
(1982) (profiling targets and assailants in a study of sexual relationships among federal
prisoners); ANTHONY M. SCACCO, JR., RAPE IN PRISON 3 (1975) (summarizing
conclusions of a study regarding sexual victimization in prison facilities); WAYNE S.
WOODEN & JAY PARKER, MEN BEHIND BARS 15-16 (1982) (listing results of a study on
the jargon used by inmates to describe homosexual relationships); Helen M. Eigenberg,
Rape in Male Prisons: Examining the Relationship Between Correctional Officers'
Attitudes Toward Rape and Their Willingness to Respond to Acts of Rape, in PRISON
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 145, 159 (Michael C. Braswell et al. eds., 2d ed. 1.994) (noting
proposed steps to ameliorate prison victimization); Richard S. Jones & Thomas J. Schmid,
Inmates' Conceptions of Prison Sexual Assault, 69 PRISON J. 53, 55 (1990) (discussing
inmate attitudes towards male sexual aggression); Carolyn Newton, Gender Theory and
Prison Sociology: Using Theories of Masculinity to Interpret the Sociology of Prisons for
Men, 33 How. J. CRIM. JUST. 193, 197 (1993) (describing the social hierarchy of male
inmates); Cindy Struckman-Johnson et. al, Sexual Coercion Reported by Men and Women
in Prison, 33 J. SEX RES. 67 passim (1996) (explaining the research methodology and
results of a study regarding sexual coercion).
5. See, e.g., Greg Burton, Prison Rapes Covered Up, Inmates Say, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Nov. 9, 1997, at B1 (contrasting the records of the Utah Department of Corrections, which
indicated dozens of reported rapes, with a report to an accrediting body by correctional
officials that claimed an absence of sexual assaults); Tamar Levin, Little Sympathy or
Remedy for Inmates Who Are Raped, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 2001, at 1, available at
http://www.mugu.com/pipermail/upstream-list/2001-April/001759.html (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (responding to a general public disinterest in the problem of
prison rape); Brenda Rodriguez, Rape Contributes to Spread of AIDS: Sexual Assaults in
Prisons Rarely Reported, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 15, 1997, at 1A
(recounting the rape and consequent infection of an inmate with AIDS and noting that
rapes are rarely reported); Charles M. Sennott, Prison System Enacts Reforms to Stop
Inmate Rape, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 1994, at 37 (noting a general public unawareness
regarding prison rape).
6. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at I. Summary and Recommendations
(delineating measures to reduce the number of prison rapes).
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In truth, prison rape is the most tolerated act of terrorism in the
United States. As one inmate stated, "Sexual assaults ... have
become unspoken, de facto parts of court-imposed punishments."7
Moreover, perpetrators of prison rape rarely face criminal
prosecution' or severe intra-prison disciplinary sanctions.9
While judicial intervention brought many improvements in
prison conditions and practices,"0 prison rape-the most widely and
deeply feared aspect of imprisonment"-has been left to fester.2 In
the meantime, the exploding prison population'3 has diminished
monitoring of inmates and created what Human Rights Watch
describes as "a stronger incentive to pacify-rather than challenge-
7. VICTOR HASSINE, LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 134 (2d ed. 1999) (describing the
author's personal experience as a "lifer").
8. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at I. Summary and Recommendations
("Few public prosecutors are concerned with prosecuting crimes committed against
inmates, preferring to leave internal prison problems to the discretion of the prison
authorities; similarly, prison officials themselves rarely push for the prosecution of
prisoner-on-prisoner abuses."); see also, e.g., Vosberg v. Solem, 845 F.2d 763, 766 (8th Cir.
1988) (reporting no prosecutions arising from more than 140 instances of assaults,
including rape, at the South Dakota State Penitentiary); HASSINE, supra note 7, at 137
(stating that prison staff "very seldom initiate criminal prosecution against a rapist");
Shara Abraham, Male Rape in U.S. Prisons: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 9 HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 5, 5 (2001) (observing that "prosecutors rarely bring charges against prison
rapists"); Rodriguez, supra note 5 (finding dozens of reported sexual assaults, but only one
reported conviction documented by the Utah Department of Corrections).
9. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at . Summary and Recommendations
("In nearly every instance Human Rights Watch has encountered, the authorities have
imposed light disciplinary sanctions against the perpetrator-perhaps thirty days in
disciplinary segregation-if that. Often rapists are simply transferred to another facility,
or are not moved at all.").
10. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY
MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE 368 (1998) (concluding that "[the prison] reform
cases were an important contribution to three major developments: the emergence of a
national corrections profession, the formulation of national standards for corrections, and
the general bureaucratization of prisons"); Alvin J. Bronstein, 15 Years of Prison
Litigation, 11 J. NAT'L PRISON PROJECT 1, 6 (Spring 1987) ("Litigation has resulted in
profound and permanent changes in the conditions under which tens of thousands of
prisoners must live."); Susan P. Strum, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 670 (1993) (concluding that "court intervention generally has
improved the living conditions and practices in the facilities at issue").
11. See CARL WEISS & DAVID JAMES FRIAR, TERROR IN THE PRISONS 4 (1974)
("[P]rison rape is the first thing [an inmate] fear[s]."); Jones & Schmid, supra note 4, at 55
("[Plerhaps, more than anything else an inmate fears sexual assault.").
12. See Charles Fried, Reflections on Crime and Punishment, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
681, 682-83 (1997) ("What we cannot blink away is the astonishing prevalence and
tolerance of sexual violence and subjugation particularly among male prisoners.").
13. Compare SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1997, at 490 tbl.6.35
(Bureau of Justice Statistics 1998) (indicating that prisons held 315,974 inmates in 1980),
with ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, PRISONERS IN 2000 2 (2001) (indicating
there were more than 1.3 million sentenced inmates by the end of 2000).
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the more dangerous prisoners who may be exploiting others."'4 For a
male behind bars,5 the bottom-line reads: "[P]rison authorities
cannot protect his body's privacy.""
The real secret about prison rape concerns its resistance to the
deterrent effects of civil rights litigation brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983."7 This Article contends that fault principally lies with the
Supreme Court's reading of the constitutional prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment. 8  In limiting its reach to deliberate
14. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at VIII. Deliberate Indifference.
15. This Article addresses solely the rape of male inmates. The literature indicates
that rape among inmates is principally confined to the male prison population. Female
inmates engage in sexual relationships with other inmates but for different reasons than
their male counterparts. Power and dominance as motivating factors for male prison rape
give way to psuedo-familial relationships among female inmates, in which sexual
relationships are largely consensual. See MICHAEL WELCH, CORRECTIONS: A CRITICAL
APPROACH (1996) (discussing the subculture of female inmates). Sexual assault of
women prisoners by staff has a long and continuing history. See, e.g., Downey v. Denton
County, Tex., 119 F.3d 381, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming an award of damages arising
from a jailer's sexual assault of a female inmate); Women Prisoners v. District of
Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 665 (D.D.C. 1994) ("The evidence revealed a level of sexual
harassment [of female inmates by staff] which is so malicious that it violates contemporary
standards of decency."), rev'd on other grounds, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996); WOMEN'S
RIGHTS PROJECT: ALL TOO FAMILIAR: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S. STATE
PRISONS 1 passim, available at http://hrw.org/reportsl996/Usl.htm (HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH 1996) (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(finding widespread sexual exploitation of female inmates by male correctional staff).
16. WEISS & FRIAR, supra note 11, at 68; see also James E. Robertson, "Fight or F..."
and Constitutional Liberty: An Inmate's Right to Self-Defense When Targeted by
Aggressors, 29 IND. L. REV. 339, 339 (1995) ("[S]taff cannot or will not protect them from
rape, assault, and other forms of victimization.") (citation omitted); Peter Scharf, Empty
Bars: Violence and the Crisis of Meaning in Prison, in PRISON VIOLENCE IN AMERICA,
supra note 4, at 27, 28 ("Prisons are largely unable to protect the physical safety of their
inmates."); Note, Sexual Assaults and Forced Homosexual Relationships in Prison: Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 36 ALB. L. REV. 429, 438 (1972) ("Victims are at the mercy of
their aggressors and receive little protection from prison authorities who are in charge of
their safe keeping.").
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (providing that "[e]very person who, under color of...
[state law] subjects, or causes ... the deprivation of any rights, immunities, or privileges
secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured"). Originally
codified in Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), § 1983 lay dormant until
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Supreme Court ruled that the drafters of the
Act provided a federal remedy when state officials failed to enforce constitutional rights
because of "prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise." Monroe, 365 U.S. at
181.
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting in relevant part "cruel and unusual
punishment"). Numerous commentators have addressed the origins of this prohibition.
See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (refusing to
engage in cruel and unusual punishment analysis unless in relation to the death penalty);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 389-90 (1910) (White, J., dissenting) (discussing the
historical basis of the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition); Anthony F. Granucci,
Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839,
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indifference to a high risk of harm,'9 the Court imagines prison rape
as individualized, culpable behavior." Accordingly, correctional
officers who possess "clean hearts," no matter their "empty headed"
response to prison rape, escape liability. 1
Part I of this Article provides a primer on prison rape and
includes discussion of the causes, frequency, and impact of prison
rape. Part II reviews the genealogy of the Supreme Court's
deliberate indifference test. Part III examines how the lower federal
courts have applied the deliberate indifference test to prison rape
litigation. Part IV advances a new constitutional jurisprudence in
prison rape cases'. Concluding remarks follow.
I. PRISON SEXUAL TERRORISM
The founders of the penitentiary had "clean hearts" if not noble
aspirations. They sought to reform offenders.22  However, what
should have been their worst fear came true:
To be an imprisoned male in the United States is to
experience a Hobbesian world; one encounters a barely
controlled jungle where the aggressive and the strong will
exploit the weak and the weak are dreadfully aware of it. A
new inmate soon learns that he must either fight his
predators or flee. Escape from inmate violence, however, is
available only in a form of segregation from the general
839-41 (1961) (noting the historical development of the American cruel and unusual
punishment prohibition); James E. Robertson, Four Little Eighteenth-Century Words: An
Integrated Reading of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 475,
482-83 (2001) (commenting on the Eighth Amendment's counter-majoritarian role in
protecting marginalized members of society).
19. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (ruling that prison officials'
deliberate indifference to a significant risk of inmate-on-inmate assault transgresses the
Eighth Amendment).
20. Roberto Unger wrote that "[m]odern social thought was born proclaiming that
society is made and imagined, that it is a human artifact rather than an expression of an
underlying natural order." ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS
SITUATION AND ITS TASK I (Cambridge 1987).
21. Excusing harm on the basis of a "clean heart and an empty head" stands in sharp
contrast to the admonishment of "you should have known better." As one commentator
observed: " '[Y]ou should have known better' suggests that the accused person is charged
with knowledge beyond the minimum required for moral and legal censure." Bailey
Kuklin, "You Should Have Known Better," 48 KAN. L. REV. 545, 549 (2000) (footnote
omitted).
22. See David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 111, 113-14 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds.,
1995) (describing the early prison as reformative in aim: "Just as the defects in the social
environment had led the inmate into crime, the disciplined and disciplining environment
of the institution would lead him out of it").
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prison population or subservience to a fellow inmate who isS 21
capable of offering protection.
While the prison has missed the mark in rehabilitating inmates
24
and reducing crime rates through deterrence 25 or incapacitation," it
23. James E. Robertson, Surviving Incarceration: Constitutional Protection from
Inmate Violence, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 101, 102 (1985-1986) (footnotes and internal
quotations omitted); see also, e.g., Falls v. Nesbit, 966 F.2d 375, 380 (8th Cir. 1992)
("Prisons are, by the very nature of the persons housed within their walls, dangerous,
violent, and sometimes unpredictable."); MATTHEW SILBERMAN, A WORLD OF
VIOLENCE 2 (1995) (describing the prison as a "world of violence in which weakness is
shunned and strength is worshipped"); HANS TOCH, POLICE, PRISONS, AND THE
PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE 53 (1977) [hereinafter TOCH, PRISONS] ("Inmates are terrorized
by other inmates, and spend years in fear of harm."); Scharf, supra note 16, at 28 ("Rapes,
beatings, knifings, and killings are commonplace occurrences in many prisons."); Hans
Toch, Study and Reducing Stress, in THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT 25, 41 (Robert
Johnson & Hans Toch eds., 1982) (describing the prison as a "human warehouse with a
junglelike underworld").
The reference to a "Hobbesian world" alludes to Thomas Hobbes's (1588-1679)
contention that humans once lived in a natural condition where the strong prevailed over
the weak. Seeking protection from their aggressive, base instincts, they formed the
Leviathan, an authoritarian state. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 186 (C.B.
MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651) (describing the state of human kind in a
state of nature as one of "continuall feare, and danger of violent death; and the life of
man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short"); see also EDGAR BODENHEIMER,
JURISPRUDENCE 131-36 (1974) (summarizing Hobbes's extensive writings); DAVID L.
WESTBY, THE GROWTH OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 23-31 (1991) (explaining Hobbes's
views on human nature). ,
24. See Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974) (reviewing numerous studies of rehabilitation and
concluding that "[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have
been reported so far have had no appreciable effects on recidivism"). Furthermore,
during the 1970s and 1980s rising crime rates, social tumult, and the growing numbers of
non-white inmates led to public opposition to rehabilitation. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN,
THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 29-31 (1981) (discussing the demise of
rehabilitation as correctional policy).
25. Deterrent theory posits that offenders are rational and will abstain from criminal
behavior if the prospective costs exceed potential gains. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY,
MALIGN NEGLECT 19 (1994) (stating that "[t]he clear weight of evidence in every Western
country indicates that tough penalties have little effect on crime rates").
26. Incapacitation theory posits that disabling offenders will reduce crime rates. See,
e.g., RICHARD HAWKINS & GEOFFREY ALPERT, AMERICAN PRISON SYSTEMS 108-28
(1989) (noting the change in the U.S. from systems of punishment such as banishment and
death to a system of incarceration). The scholarly literature largely concludes that
imprisonment has a marginal impact on crime rates. See, e.g., JOSEPH DILLION DAVEY,
THE POLITICS OF PRISON EXPANSION 108 (1998) (stating that "the association between
increases in crime rates and the increase in imprisonment rates showed a low correlational
coefficient"); Alfred Blumstein, Prisons, in CRIME 387, 391 (James Q. Wilson & Joan
Petersilia eds., 1995) (observing that "crime rates have not dramatically declined despite a
quadrupling of the prison population, which perhaps suggest[s] that the considerable
growth in the prison population ... has not succeeded in significantly reducing the crime
rate") (emphasis omitted). But see RICHARD A. WRIGHT, IN DEFENSE OF PRISONS 133
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has come of age in one endeavor-promoting sexual terrorism. In its
most elementary state, "[s]exual terrorism is the system by which
males frighten, and by frightening, dominate and control females."27
No matter that victim and assailant in prison rape are both biological
males; the target is socially reconstructed-he is " 'female,' in the eyes
of other inmates."28 The victim's immediate referent group, other
inmates, redefines the victim as a submissive, surrogate woman.
29
Consequently, as the court in Schwenk v. Hartford0 observed, "The
victims of these attacks are frequently called female names and terms
indicative of gender animus ... [such as] 'pussy' and 'bitch[,]' during
the assaults and thereafter."3
Ironically, men rape other men in prison to validate their
masculinity. 2  The prison rapist lives in an environment that
(1994) (acknowledging that prisons are a "maligned and vilified" institution, but arguing
that they are "modestly effective" in their deterrent and incapacitative functions).
27. Carole J. Sheffield, Sexual Terrorism: The Social Control of Women, in
ANALYZING GENDER 171,171 (Myra Marx Ferree & Beth B. Hess eds., 1987).
28. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at V. Rape Scenarios; cf Harold
Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, in SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
205, 205 (Jerome G. Manis & Bernard N. Meltzer eds., 1967) (describing a degradation
ceremony as a process "whereby the public identity of an actor is transformed into
something looked on as lower in the local scheme of social types").
29. See WOODEN & PARKER, supra note 4, at 16.
30. 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
31. Id. at 1203 n.14. Sexual assault assigns inmates to well defined roles within an
aggression-based social hierarchy. A categorization of these rules includes:
Pitcher-a heterosexual inmate who is the aggressor in instances of sexual
victimization and thus occupies the masculine role.
Daddy-a heterosexual inmate who "courts, befriends, or patronizes weaker,
inexperienced inmates into sexual gratification."
Kid-a heterosexual or bisexual inmate, sometimes referred to as a "sex slave,"
who provides sexual gratification often in exchange for protection.
Punk-a heterosexual or bisexual inmate who initially resists sexual approaches
but eventually submits.
Fag-a so-called "natural homosexual."
Queen-a homosexual or transsexual inmate who adopts effeminate behavior
and typically plays a submissive role in sexual acts.
Skinner-a sex offender.
Diddler-a child molester.
James E. Robertson, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in United States Prisons: Sexual
Harassment Among Male Inmates, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 7 n.21 (1999) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Robert W. Dumond, The Sexual Assault of Male Inmates in Incarcerated
Settings, 20 INT'L J. SOC. L. 135, 139 tbl.2 (1992)).
32. See, e.g., Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1203 n.14 ("[P]rison rapists commit assaults in
part to establish and maintain masculine gender."); SCACCO, supra note 4, at 3 ("It
[i.e., sexual victimization] is an act whereby one male (or group of males) seeks
testimony to what he considers is an outward validation of his masculinity."); Kevin
N. Wright, The Violent and Victimized in a Male Prison, in PRISON VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA, supra note 4, at 103, 119 ("The literature suggests that prison violence is
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perversely encourages sexual assault by equating manhood with
domination and femininity with subservience.33 Accordingly, most
sexual aggressors define themselves as heterosexual, if not as "real
men."34 Moreover, the structure of prison life constantly assaults one's
manhood, denying respite to sexual aggressors and only further
victimizing their prey.35 For example, the single-sex population
deprives inmates the validation of women sexual partners;" numerous
official rules governing inmate behavior rob them of the autonomy
associated with masculinity;37 and limitations on physical possessions
preclude the affirmation of self through property ownership, such as
cars and the like.38
In 1961, A.V. Huffman pioneered the study of sexual aggression
in prison. 9 He discerned "extreme anxiety, confusion, and tension"
among victims:" "Some had reacted by feigning suicide or other
compulsive behavior."'" Forty years later, Human Rights Watch had
little new to add. "Victims of prison rape," it concluded, "commonly
related to the threat incarceration poses to the individual's identity and particularly
his sense of masculinity."); cf Donald J. Cotton & A. Nicholas Groth, Inmate Rape:
Prevention and Intervention, 2 J. PRISON & JAIL HEALTH 47, 50 (1982) ("Rape is not
primarily motivated by the frustration of sexual needs.").
33. See Lee H. Bowker, Victimizers and Victims in American Correctional Institutions,
in THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT, supra note 23, at 63, 64 ("[V]ictories in the field of
battle reassure the winners of their competence as human beings in the face of the
passivity enforced by institutional regulations. This is particularly important for prisoners
whose masculinity is threatened by the conditions of confinement."); see also, e.g., SUSAN
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 265 (1975) (stating that "[h]omosexual rape in the
Philadelphia prisons turned out to be a microcosm of the female experience with
heterosexual rape"); A. NICHOLAS GROTH, MEN WHO RAPE 13 (1979) ("In every act of
rape, both aggression and sexuality are involved, but it is clear that sexuality becomes the
means of expressing the aggressive needs and feelings that operate in the offender and
underlie his assault."); cf. WOODEN & PARKER, supra note 4, at 14 (explaining that in the
inmate subculture "eroticism has come to be associated with aggression").
34. See LOCKWOOD, supra note 4, at 124.
35. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 4, at 197 ("[T]he prisoner's masculinity is in fact
besieged from every side .... ).
36. GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 71-72 (1958) (observing that
"[a] society composed exclusively of men tends to generate anxieties in its members
concerning their masculinity").
37. Id. at 76 (rendering inmates "dependent" upon staff for their welfare and thereby
constituting "a serious threat to the prisoner's self-image as a fully accredited member of
adult society").
38. Id. at 69 (observing that "in modern Western culture, material possessions are so
large a part of the individual's conception of himself that to be stripped of them is to be
attacked at the deepest layers of personality").
39. See A.V. Huffman, Problems Precipitated by Homosexual Approaches on
Youthful First Offenders, 7 J. SOC. THERAPY 217 passim (1961).
40. Id. at 221.
41. Id.
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reported nightmares, deep depression, shame, loss of self-esteem,
self-hatred, and considering or attempting suicide."42 Indeed, their
trauma may exceed that of female sexual assault victims.43
Prison rape victims suffer on average nine coerced sexual acts."
Once identified as any "easy mark," the victim becomes all the more
appealing to aggressors:
"Piri I've been hit on already," he said ....
"Well, I got friendly with this guy name Rube." Rube was a
muscle bound degenerate whose sole ambition in life was to
cop young kids' behinds. "Yeah," I said, "and so. ... "
"Well, this cat has come through with smokes and food and
candy and, well, he's a spic like me and he talked about the
street outside and about guys we know outside and he
helped me out with favors ......
"My God, I thought, what can I tell him? .... Rube would
use that first time to hold him by threatening to tell
everybody that he screwed him. And if anybody found out,
every wolf in the joint would want to cop.' 4
Commentators disagree over the number of victims.4" Estimates
range from one percent of the prison population to as high as twenty-
eight percent.47 In fact, a statistical fog surrounds prison rape: "[W]e
have no way of accurately determining a national rate.,
48
42. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at VI. Body and Soul: The Physical and
Psychological Injury of Prison Rape. Numerous published studies separated the Human
Rights Watch report from Huffman's. See, e.g., Donald J. Cotton & A. Nicholas Groth,
Sexual Assault in Correctional Institutions: Prevention and Intervention, in VICTIMS OF
SEXUAL AGGRESSION: TREATMENT OF CHILDREN, WOMEN, AND MEN 127 passim
(Irving R. Stuart & Joanne G. Greer eds., 1984); Robert W. Dumond, The Sexual Assault
of Male Inmates in Incarcerated Settings, 20 INT'L J. SOC. L. 135 passim (1992); Edward H.
Peeples, Jr. & Anthony M. Scacco, Jr., The Stress Impact Study Technique: A Method for
Evaluating the. Consequences of Male-On-Male Sexual Assault in Jails, Prisons, and Other
Selected Single-Sex Institutions, in MALE RAPE 241 passim (Anthony M. Scacco, Jr., ed.,
1982); Struckman-Johnson et al., supra note 4, passim.
43. See Cotton & Groth, supra note 42, at 131.
44. See Struckman-Johnson et. al, supra note 4, at 75.
45. PIRI THOMAS, DOWN THESE MEAN STREETS 265-66 (1967); see, e.g., Schwenk v.
Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1203 n.14 (9th Cir 2000) ("Once raped, an inmate is marked as a
victim and is subsequently vulnerable to repeated violation."); LaMarca v. Turner, 662 F.
Supp. 647, 686 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (observing that "[o]nce an inmate is raped, he is marked as
a victim for repeated sexual assaults for the remainder of his imprisonment"), affd in part
and vacated in part on other grounds, 995 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993).
46. See generally Christopher Hensley et al., The History of Prison Sex Research, 80
PRISON J. 360 passim (2000) (providing a primer on the prison rape literature).
47. See Daniel Lockwood, Sexual Exploitation in Prison, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN PRISONS 440, 440 (Marilyn D. McShane & Frank D. Williams III eds., 1996).
Compare, e.g., LOCKWOOD, supra note 4, at 18 (reporting that 28% of male inmates at
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Several factors account for this uncertainty. Most victims do not
self-report rape.49 They abstain out of shame," intimidation," and
fear of being identified as a "rat" 2 and an "easy mark" for future acts
two maximum security prisons in New York had experienced aggressive sexual behavior,
with 51% involving some degree of physical violence, and finding that 71% of white
inmates under the age of twenty-one reported being targeted for aggressive sexual
approaches), Cindy Struckman-Johnson & David Struckman-Johnson, Sexual Coercion
Rates in Seven Midwestern Prison Facilities for Men, 80 PRISON J. 379, 383 (2000) (finding
sexual aggression rates of 21% and 20% among inmates in seven Midwestern facilities),
Struckman-Johnson et. al, supra note 4, at 7 (reporting a 13% rate of rape in a Nebraska
prison), and WOODEN & PARKER, supra note 4, at 1 (finding that 15% of inmates in a
California prison reported that they had been raped), with, e.g., NACCI & KANE, supra
note 4, at 8-9 tbl.1 (finding that 11% of inmates housed in one federal prison experienced
sexual aggression, and less than 1% stated that they performed a nonconsensual sex act,
but that 29% responded affirmatively when asked if they had been propositioned),
Christine A. Saum et al., Sex in Prison: Exploring Myths and Realities, 75 PRISON J. 413,
427 (1995) (finding that less than 1% of inmates queried in a Delaware prison
acknowledged being raped), and Richard Tewksbury, Measures of Sexual Behavior in an
Ohio Prison, 74 SOC. & SOC. RES. 34, 36 (1989) (concluding that less than 1% of inmates
queried in an Ohio prison acknowledged being raped).
48. Lockwood, supra note 47, at 440; see also Struckman-Johnson & Struckman-
Johnson, supra note 47, at 383 (observing that "after decades of research, social scientists
have yet to agree on what percentage of incarcerated men experience coercive sexual
contact"). A bare majority of states compile data on reported prison rape. See Abraham,
supra note 8, at 5 (discussing the "curtain of silence" that surrounds prison rape).
49. See, e.g., HASSINE, supra note 7, at 137 (observing that rape victims "seldom
report" their victimization); Abraham, supra note 8, at 6 (describing the "severe
underreporting" of prison rape by victims); Siegal, supra note 2, at 1545 (stating that
victims are "disinclined to report these attacks"); Struckman-Johnson & Struckman-
Johnson, supra note 47, at 380 (writing that "many researchers have noted that sexual
assault is likely to be underreported by male prisoners"); Vetstein, supra note 2, at 870
(stating that "few victims" report prison rape).
50. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at VII. Anomaly or Epidemic
(describing "the terrible stigma" attached to prison rape). A 1996 study of Nebraska
inmates concluded that half of the victims did not disclose their worst-case incident to
anyone and of those who did confide in someone, 23% told friends and family; 23%
confided in another inmate; 18% in counselors or clergy; and 10% in medical staff. See
Struckman-Johnson et. al, supra note 4, at 75.
51. See, e.g., Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 665 (8th Cir. 1992) (recounting withdrawal
of the plaintiff's complaint against his assailant after being threatened by him).
52. See, e.g., Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 989 (4th Cir. 1985) ("In addition to
violence officially observed but unreported, the evidence makes clear that if violence is
not officially observed, the inmates' fear of being retaliated against for 'snitching' severely
limits any possibility that inmate witnesses will make any report."); Smith v. Norris, 877 F.
Supp. 1296, 1304 (E.D. Ark. 1995) ("Since rapes are almost always accompanied by
threats of retaliation, if the victim tells staff, one wonders how many rapes occurred that
were not reported-the victim preferring to find safety via some other mechanism within
the inmate culture." (quoting an unpublished report by the Civil Rights Division of the
United States Department of Justice (July, 1991))), affd in part and rev'd in part, Smith v.
Ark. Dep't of Corr., 103 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 1996); Smith v. Ullman, 874 F. Supp. 979, 985
(D. Neb. 1994) (noting that naming one's assailant is an act of snitching, a practice "often
brutally discouraged in the general [prison] population"); Jensen v. Gunter, 807 F. Supp.
1463, 1472 (D. Neb. 1992) ("First, there is a reluctance among inmates to inform prison
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of aggression. 3  Moreover, as the court in Anderson v. Redman54
noted, "By the time an inmate reaches his initial classification
destination, be it maximum, medium, or minimum, it is difficult to
discern non-consensual homosexual activity, because the resistance of
most non-consensual victims has been broken by that time."5
Coercive techniques-such as extorting sex for overdue debts56 or
protection from fellow inmates57-lead most victims to surrender their
bodies silently but not willingly. 8
officials of the misconduct of another inmate. This is termed 'snitching,' and is frowned
upon severely by other inmates." (citation omitted)); SYKES, supra note 36, at 87 ("[T]he
name is never applied lightly as a joking insult .... Instead, it represents the most serious
accusation that one inmate can level at another for it implies a betrayal that transcends the
specific act of disclosure."); Raymond G. Kessler & Julian B. Roebuck, Snitch, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 47, at 449 (explaining that snitches
are "hated and despised... and may be the object of violent reprisals").
53. See Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 160 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[I]t appears that once a
prisoner has been thus victimized, word spreads throughout the prison and he becomes a
special target for subsequent attacks."); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 925 n.115
(S.D. Tex. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (delineating various
reasons why victims do not report attacks, including "reluctance to identify oneself as an
easy mark"), rev'd on other grounds, 178 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 1999).
54. 429 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Del. 1977).
55. Id. at 1117 n.31. Estimates of consensual inmate sexual activity vary, ranging from
2% to 65%, possibly due to the fact that inmates underreport sexual activity, fearing they
will be labeled as "weak." Christopher Hensley, Consensual Homosexual Activity in Male
Prisons, in 26 CORRECTIONS COMPEDIUM 1, 1 (2001); see also Helen Eigenberg,
Correctional Officers and Their Perceptions of Homosexuality, Rape, and Prostitution in
Male Prisons, 80 PRISON J. 415, 425 (2000) (reporting that 96% of correctional officers
found it sometimes difficult "to distinguish between consensual and coercive [sexual] acts
among inmates"); Saum et al., supra note 47, at 418 (concluding that "some sexual activity
may appear consensual although an inmate may actually be coerced").
56. See Helen M. Eigenberg, Homosexuality in Male Prisons: Demonstrating the Need
for a Social Constructionist Approach, 17 CRIM. JUST. REV. 219, 222 (1992) (describing
how aggressive inmates provide "gifts" to new nafve inmates and then demand "payment
or else"). As recently as the 1970s some commentators perceived the resulting sexual
activity as instances of "seduction" rather than rape. See Helen M. Eigenberg,
Correctional Officers' Definitions of Rape in Male Prisons, 28 J. CRIM. JUST. 435, 437-38
(2000) [hereinafter Eigenberg, Correctional Officers' Definitions of Rape in Male Prisons]
(citing commentators writing between 1951-1975).
57. See, e.g., Payne v. Collins, 986 F. Supp 1036,1048 & n.18 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (finding
the existence of inmate violence by virtue of the fact that inmates pay "protection money,"
which "usually assumes the form of ... goods ... or participation in homosexual acts");
WOODEN & PARKER, supra note 4, at 189-204 (finding that correctional officers agreed
with the proposition that "it is a very common occurrence for young, straight boys to be
turned out, or forced into being punks"); Eigenberg, supra note 55, at 420-21 (describing
the process whereby vulnerable inmates find "protectors" who later threaten to cease their
"good deed" unless sexual payments are given).
58. See, e.g., Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 665 (8th Cir. 1992) (describing an
assailant's intimidation of his victim, who consequently checked out of administrative
segregation and thus e~posed himself to further victimization); Wells v. Israel, 854 F.2d
995, 1000 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Wells himself sent three letters soliciting homosexual favors
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Staff members bear witness to prison rape as a fact of life behind
bars. Eighty-six percent of surveyed Texas correctional officers
"disagreed" or "strongly disagreed" that prison rape rarely occurs.
59
In turn, officers queried in a California prison strongly supported the
following propositions: (1) "forced or pressured sexual encounters
are very common"; (2) "homosexual inmates have a more difficult
time than heterosexual inmates due to [sexual] pressure"; and (3) "it
is a very common occurrence for young, straight boys to be turned
out, or forced into being punks." 6 Moreover, officers surveyed in two
New York prisons knew of two-thirds of the sexual incidents
recounted by targeted inmates.61
Staff awareness of prison rape does not confer a willingness to
deter sexual aggressors or rescue their victims. Justice Blackmun
correctly charged that "[p]rison officials either are disinterested in
stopping abuse of prisoners by other prisoners or are incapable of
doing so, given the limited resources society allocates to the prison
system."'62 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals would later agree:
"[S]ome prison administrators [are unable or unwilling] to take the
necessary steps to protect their prisoners from sexual and physical
assaults by other inmates. 63 Indeed, a distinguished district judge,
Frank Johnson, found the "well-designed and intentioned policies
and procedures" of Texas prisons to be a faqade: '
Evidence has shown that, in fact, prison officials deliberately
resist providing reasonable safety to inmates. The result is
that individual prisoners who seek protection from their
attacker are either not believed, disregarded, or told that
there is a lack of evidence to support action by the prison
system .... Prison officials at all levels play a game of
and threatening harm if those favors were not granted."); Eigenberg, Officers' Definitions
of Rape in Male Prisons, supra note 56, at 438 ("[RJape in prison often relies upon
extortion techniques where coercion is more important than outright force."); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at L Summary and Recommendations ("Prisoners,
including those who had been forcibly raped, all agree that the threat of violence, or even
just the implicit threat of violence, is a more common factor in sexual abuse than is actual
violence.").
59. Helen Eigenberg, Male Rape: An Empirical Examination of Correctional Officers'
Attitudes Toward Rape in Prison, 69 PRISON J. 39, 44 tbl.3 (1989) (finding that 50%
disagreed that rape is rare and another 35.5% of the officers strongly disagreed).
60. WOODEN & PARKER, supra note 4, at 189-204.
61. See LOCKWOOD, supra note 4, at 130.
62. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(footnotes omitted).
63. Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 470 (8th Cir. 1984).
64. Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 928 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
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willing disbelief, one that appears adequate on paper and
fails dismally in practice.65
Surveys of correctional officers reveal deep ambivalence about
prison rape. Many prison employees believe that inmates bear
principal responsibility for combating sexual aggression.66  In their
eyes, those who refrain from combat become unworthy of
protection.67 Corrections officers often view gay inmates as legitimate
targets. 68
According to some inmates, staff regard rape as a legitimate
deterrent to crime and a just desert for its commission. "The guards
just turn their backs," observed one inmate; "[t]heir mentality is the
tougher, colder, and more cruel and inhuman a place is, the less
chance a person will return., 69 Author Victor Hassine, himself a lifer,
concurred: "Some staff members ... view prison rape as part of the
punishment-risk that lawbreakers take when they commit their
65. Id.; see also SCACCO, supra note 4, at 30 (stating that "[t]he shocking fact is that
there is both overt and covert implication of officers in the [sexual] attacks that take place
in penal institutions"); Alan J. Davis, Sexual Assaults in the Philadelphia Prison System
and Sheriffs Van, in MALE RAPE 107, 111 (Anthony M. Scacco, Jr. ed., 1982) (observing a
"lack of supervision by guards and the inadequate facilities to provide security").
66. See, e.g., LEE H. BOWKER, PRISON VICTIMIZATION 13 (1980) (observing that
some correctional staff "tell them to fight it out"); HANS TOCH, LIVING IN PRISON 208
(rev. ed. 1992) (observing that prison staff "advise inmates of the advantages of using
violence when one is threatened"); Eigenberg, supra note 4, at 159 (observing that prison
staff "in the prison vernacular .... seem to offer little assistance to inmates except the age-
old advice of 'fight or fuck' "). For instance, in addressing conditions in a Florida prison,
the court in LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993), observed: "When alerted
to specific dangers, prison staff often looked the other way rather than protect inmates.
Rather than offer to help, the staff suggested that the inmates deal with their problems
'like men,' that is, use physical force against the aggressive inmate." Id. at 1533.
67. See Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 354 (3d Cir. 1992) (asserting that a
correctional officer told the plaintiff that "protection was not one of his duties, that
plaintiff had better learn to get along because the officials at Lewisburg do not like
crybabies"); WOODEN & PARKER, supra note 4, at 2 ("In response to his claims of sexual
assault and harassment, one of the staff members stated, 'I don't feel sorry for you.
You're getting what you deserve.' ").
68. See Eigenberg, Correctional Officers' Definitions of Rape in Male Prisons, supra
note 56, at 444-45. Writing to Human Rights Watch, a homosexual inmate in Texas
described the disbelief of staff upon learning of his rape:
Defendant J.M, a security officer with the rank of sergeant, came to investigate
the series of latest allegations. Defendant J.M. refused to interview the inmate
witnesses and told plaintiff that he was lying about being sexually abused. After
plaintiff vehemently protested that he was being truthful, defendant J.M. made
comments that plaintiff "must be gay" for "letting them make you suck dick."
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at VIII. Deliberate Indifference (footnote
omitted).
69. Id. at Prisoners' Voices I (inmate R.L., New York, Oct. 21, 1996).
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crimes. Others see it simply as retribution carried out at an
interpersonal level."70
Professor Helen Eigenberg advances a more serious allegation:
[S]ome officers may use rape or the threat of sexual violence
to control inmates. Some officers may manipulate housing
assignments to intimidate inmates by threatening to assign
more vulnerable inmates to bunk with known sexual
predators. Or, perhaps officers may tolerate coercive acts
because they facilitate division among inmates, making
them, as a group, more manageable."
Letters from inmates support her assessment. "The main reason why
sexual assaults occur," wrote one inmate, "is because prison officials
and staff promote them. It's their method of sacrificing the weak
inmates to achieve and maintain control of the stronger aggressive or
violent inmates., 72 Another inmate observed: "[I]t seems that young
men and gays and first timers are used as sacrificial lamb [sic]. The
reason is to use these men as a way to keep the gangs and killers from
turning on the system which created prison the Hell that it is.
73
Similar allegations arise in federal courts.74 For instance, the self-
admitted rapist in Richardson v. Penford"5  described an
"arrangement" with an officer: he and other inmates would have
access to "any new kid ... in return for information of contraband on
the Unit. '' 76 The plaintiff in Richardson had been repeatedly raped
even though he had informed the defendant correctional officer of his
70. HASSINE, supra note 7, at 136.
71. Correctional Officers' Definitions of Rape in Male Prisons, supra note 56, at 436;
see also HASSINE, supra note 7, at 144 (characterizing some rapes as a "set-up," in which
staff arrange the rape of an inmate).
72. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at Prisoners' Voices I (inmate W.F.,
Missouri, Sept. 21, 1996).
73. Id. at Prisoners' Voices 1 (inmate R.G., California, Oct. 21, 1996); see also
HASSINE, supra note 7, at 136 ("Pragmatic prison officials probably see rape as an
effective management tool that provides potentially dangerous inmates with sexual
gratification, while at the same time pitting inmates against each other.").
74. See, e.g., Northington v. Marin, 102 F.3d 1564, 1567-68 (10th Cir. 1996) (claiming
that defendant officer identified the plaintiff as a "snitch"); Pavlick v. Mifflin, 90 F.3d 205,
209 (7th Cir. 1996) (ruling that a jury could infer knowledge of an impending assault on
the part of a guard who left an inmate's cell unlocked while he slept); Richardson v.
Penfold, 839 F.2d 392, 394-96 (7th Cir. 1988) (ruling that a guard could be liable for an
inmate's rape because he allowed the rapist to enter the plaintiff's cell despite his plea not
to be left alone with him); Morgan v. Ariz. Dep't of Corr., 976 F. Supp. 892, 893 (D. Ariz.
1997) (alleging that a correctional officer assigned the plaintiff a cellmate who had earlier
told the defendant officer of his desire to injure the plaintiff).
75. 839 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1988).
76. Id. at 394.
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fears.77 Left defenseless, he discovered that sexual terrorism arises
from the conduct of both staff and inmates.
II. BLAMING THE VICTIM
The Supreme Court first articulated the concept of deliberate
indifference in Estelle v. Gamble.7' An inmate injured on a Texas
prison farm complained that the medical care he received violated the
Eighth Amendment.9  Speaking for the Court, Justice Marshall read
the Eighth Amendment to prohibit "deliberate indifference to [the]
serious medical needs" of prisoners."0 He attributed this standard to
"the common law view that 'it is but just that the public be required
to care for the prisoner, who cannot, by reason of the deprivation of
liberty, care for himself.' ,8 Except to indicate that deliberate
indifference entails "wanton infliction of unnecessary pain," Justice
Marshall failed to delineate how one would state a cognizable claim8 2
Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter, feared that the Court's opinion
could be read to require a "subjective motivation of the defendant."83
His reading of the Eighth Amendment precluded a state-of-mind
requirement in that the "character of the punishment" alone could
inflict impermissible harm. 4  While the district and circuit courts
subsequently agreed that prison rape victims must prove deliberate
indifference, they broke ranks over the requisite mental state needed
for liability. Some courts required proof of the defendants' actual
knowledge of a high risk of rape. Other courts found safe harbor in
the objective tort law standard of what defendants ought to have
known. 6
77. See id. at 393-94.
78. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
79. See id. at 99-102.
80. Id. at 106.
81. Id. at 103-04 (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132 S.E. 291, 293
(1926)).
82. Id. at 105.
83. Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. See, e.g., Harris v. Maynard, 843 F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that when
the prisoner's "very right to life is at stake," the requisite mental state for deliberate
indifference would be met); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 1985)
(noting that a guard's refusal to allow treatment for a prisoner's serious illness constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment).
86. See, e.g., Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting that a showing
of "pervasive risk" of harm is sufficient to establish the requisite tort standard for reckless
disregard); Gullatte v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing the objective
test for tort liability that requires a plaintiff to show that a prison official "knew or should
have known" of the high likelihood of harm); LaMarca v. Turner, 662 F. Supp. 647, 686
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Wilson v. Seiter'7 then brought clarity to the deliberate
indifference test. The petitioner complained of several conditions of
confinement, including unsanitary lavatories, insect infestation, and
inadequate heating and ventilation.' The defendants secured a
summary judgment before the district court, and the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.89 Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice
Scalia ruled that prison conditions, however adverse, cannot inflict
cruel and unusual punishment unless the defendant prison officer
acted with "a sufficiently culpable state of mind."' 9 After reviewing
several Eighth Amendment cases, Justice Scalia concluded that
"deliberate indifference" constituted the minimum degree of
culpability.9  Moreover, he defined deliberate indifference as
"wanton" infliction of pain and suffering.92
In Farmer v. Brennan,93 the Supreme Court once again addressed
the deliberate indifference standard. Left to fend for himself in the
general prison population, a transsexual inmate had been raped. 4 His
suit failed at trial because his keepers did not know of any threat
specifically directed at him.9 His appeal to the Supreme Court rested
on the proposition that the staff must have known that his
transgendered body would place him in grave danger.96 The Farmer
Court embraced the analysis posited in Wilson v. Seiler,97 but made
two clarifications. First, actual knowledge of a significant risk of
injury could arise from situations so dangerous that the defendants
"must have known" of the perils facing the plaintiff.99 Second, a
substantial risk of harm need not be specific to the plaintiff if "all
prisoners in ... [the plaintiff's] situation face such a risk."99  A
unanimous Court remanded for a determination whether the
(S.D. Fla. 1987) (ruling that the defendant officer knew or should have known of the
dangers facing the plaintiff), affid in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 995 F.2d
1526 (11th Cir. 1993).
87. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
88. See id. at 296.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 298.
91. Id. at 304 (quoting LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1987)).
92. Id. at 303.
93. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
94. See id. at 830.
95. See id. at 832.
96. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (No.
92-7247).
97. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 (approving Wilson's actual knowledge requirement).
98. See id. at 842 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
99. Id. at 842-43.
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defendants actually knew that the plaintiff as a transsexual faced a
high risk of assault.""0
As illustrated by the rulings in Wilson and Farmer, McGill v.
Duckworth... provided the lower federal courts with the test for cruel
and unusual punishment that perversely blames rape victims. The
plaintiff brought suit after being raped in an unsupervised prison
shower room."2  His assailants had made "sexually suggestive
comments" as they followed him to the shower area. 03 In route, he
encountered two correctional officers but said nothing about his
nearby tormentors.' Because the plaintiff had failed to inform the
officers of his fears, the court ruled that his rape did not inflict cruel
and unusual punishment. 5 "A prisoner normally proves actual
knowledge of impending harm," explained Judge Easterbrook, "by
showing that he complained to prison officials about a specific threat
to his safety.""1 6 As a precondition for constitutional protection from
rape, the court required what many potential victims of rape would
find too dangerous-a willingness to rat.07
Contemporaneous with the Duckworth, Wilson, and Farmer
trilogy of cases, Lawrence Friedman wrote of "the exaggerated
individualism of twentieth-century Americans"' 8 and its expression in
the criminal justice system as a "deep concern for ... individual
responsibility" for criminal acts.'" Indeed, this "exaggerated
100. See id. at 848.
101. 944 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1991).
102. See id at 346.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 349-50.
106. Id. at 349.
107. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing and documenting inmates'
refusal to rat on sexual aggressors). The following is illustrative of the stigma attached to
ratting, even for victims of rape:
Green [a rape victim] is asked to name his rapists. Apologetically, he refuses,
frightened for his life. He is curtly told that if he doesn't give names nothing can
be done for him. They plan to send him back to the same cell. While still in the
hospital, Green spends hours of agonized thought over whether to release the
name. The guards must realize what will happen to him if he does .... No
names, he decides.
WEISS & FRIAR, supra note 11, at 5.
108. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
438 (1993).
109. Id. at 443; see also Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for
Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 866-67 (2000) ("America
has always been a strongly individualistic society, but that aspect of our social character
seems to have grown more pronounced during this period of rapid social and economic
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individualism" and its attendant "ideology of responsibility '11  have
shaped the application of the Constitution to prison violence,
including inmate-on-inmate rape. We can see their influence in
Duckworth's use of the deliberate indifference test. Writing for the
court, Judge Easterbrook required the plaintiff to take responsibility
for his safety by confiding with his keepers."' The plaintiff, however,
"chose" silence" 2 and thus would alone bear the risk of rape.
Judge Easterbook failed to grasp that in prison one's choices are
framed by the social environment. For the Duckworth plaintiff, his
social environment transformed an unsullied "choice"-that is,
whether to seek protection by informing staff of his fears-into a
profound dilemma: to rat and risk assault for transgressing the most
important of inmate norms;' or to remain silent and "fight or
fuck.' 14 For most inmates, the only honorable and manly course is
fighting one's tormentors. 5 Many prison workers agree that violence
undertaken to prevent rape represents legitimate use of force.' 6
change, and a growth in individualism naturally implicates concerns about group
solidarity.").
110. Richard C. Boldt, Criminal Law: Restitution, Criminal Law, and the Ideology of
Individuality, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 1017 (1986) (stating that the ideology
of responsibility "creates images of autonomous individuals and represents them to the
community as reality"); see also Suzzana Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 544-50 (1986) (juxtaposing the "modern"
individualistic paradigm with the "classical" holistic paradigm). "Individualism," wrote
Alexis de Tocqueville, "[exists in the American character as a] mature and calm feeling
which disposes each citizen to sever himself from the mass of his fellows .... " ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 104 (Henry Reeve text, Phillips Bradley ed.,
Vintage Books 1945) (1835). Tocqueville attributed American individualism to a
democratic and egalitarian society that "intoxicated [people] with their new power." Id. at
105. Instead of acknowledging their debt to this society, "they acquire[d] the habit of
always considering themselves as standing alone... Id.
111. See McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 349 (7th Cir. 1991).
112. See id. at 346.
113. See supra note 52 (documenting the contempt inmates have for "rats" and the
grave dangers that arise from being identified as a snitch).
114. See Robertson, supra note 16, at 339 (observing that "most inmates have but two
[realistic] options: to fight in self-defense or become passive victims of a predatory
subculture").
115. See, e.g., LOCKWOOD, supra note 4, at 13 (observing that "[t]he target's violent
response is an explicit normative expectation"); Robertson, supra note 16, at 346
(concluding that "target-initiated violence is the normative response among inmates to
homosexual propositions").
116. See SILBERMAN, supra note 23, at 19 ("Not only do inmates justify violence in the
name of self-defense, but correctional officers frequently lend support to such aggressive
responses."); TOCH, supra note 66, at 208-10 (stating that correctional officers respect
inmates who fight and inform inmates of the advantages of doing battle); Robertson, supra
note 16, at 346 ("Correctional officers also view target-initiated violence as a legitimate
form of self-defense."). Robertson also reported that twelve state departments of
correction explicitly recognize self-defense as grounds for acquittal in disciplinary
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In the deliberate indifference test, the Supreme Court has
constructed a constitutional framework that excludes a significant
segment of prison rape victims from Eighth Amendment protection.
It does so in a manner similar to the doctrine of assumption of risk.
This doctrine provides that workers assent to the ordinary dangers of
the workplace and thus cannot recover damages for resulting injury.117
Like the deliberate indifference test, the assumption of risk doctrine
posits that individuals make free and rational choices about the risks
and rewards of their endeavors."8 But the victim of prison rape does
not "choose" a prison environment that constructs some inmates as
surrogate women, while expecting every inmate to be "a man" and
not "rat-out" his tormenters"9 and/or flee to protective custody.2 '
Just as "economic compulsion," not free will, drove workers to
"assume" workplace risk,2 the Hobson's choice offered rape targets
belies the notion of individual freedom. Blaming them for their
victimization should not stand.
hearings; another twenty-one departments customarily permit acquittal on grounds of self-
defense. See Robertson, supra note 16, at 349-51 (surveying the policies and practices of
state departments of corrections when self-defense is at issue in disciplinary charges).
117. See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 480 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.,
5th ed. 1984) (describing the doctrine of assumption of risk).
118. See, e.g., Scott Giesler, The Uncertain Future of Assumption of Risk in California,
28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1495, 1514 (1995) (describing how the assumption of risk doctrine
arose from a belief in individual choice and freedom); Samuel R. Guelli, Tort Law: The
Status of Assumption of Risk in Product Liability in Ohio After Cremeans v. Willmar
Henderson Mfg., 566 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio 1991), 18 DAYTON L. REV. 243, 252 n.73 (1992)
("Commentators recognized that assumption of risk was derived from theories of
individualism and laissez-faire economics ...."); Jordan Yospe, U.S. Industries v.
Director: "Claim" Versus "Condition" in the Analysis of Workers' Compensation Cases,
12 AM. J. L. & MED. 273, 274 (1986) ("Such common law defenses arose in part from the
then prevalent ideology of individualism and a desire to encourage industrial expansion.").
119. See supra note 52 (indicating that inmates who identify their assailants are
considered "rats").
120. Protective custody is a form of restrictive, segregated housing for inmates-at-risk.
See Hosna v. Groose, 80 F.3d 298, 301 (8th Cir. 1996) (describing the restrictions imposed
on protective custody inmates, including few privileges, limited personal property,
confinement in their cells for all but two or three hours a day, and exclusion from prison
programming). In the inmate subculture, protective custody housing is seen as a refuge
for snitches or inmates unable to cope with the general prison population. See infra text
accompanying notes 187-88 (discussing the harsh stigma imposed upon protective custody
inmates by the inmate subculture).
121. See Jane P. North, Comment, Employee's Assumption of Risk: Real or Illusory
Choice?, 52 TENN. L. REV. 35, 49 (1984) (observing that the "most telling criticism" of the
doctrine arises from the lack of voluntariness in the assumption of risk in everyday life);
see also PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 117, at 91 (observing
that the doctrine has been "violent[ly] denounc[ed] at the hands of every writer who has
dealt with the subject") (footnote omitted).
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III. THE SUM OF ITS PARTS
The deliberate indifference test that emerged from Farmer v.
Brennan122 consists of two inquiries in rape cases. First, did the
defendant possess actual knowledge of the dangers facing a specific or
readily identifiable inmate?23 Second, if this is the case, did the
defendant fail to respond in a reasonable manner?"' In large part, the
Court has left the substance of these provisions to be determined by
the lower federal courts.125 "[T]he Supreme Court," observed one
commentator, "seems to make law in the same way as Congress and
other legislatures-by announcing abstract rules.,
126
Two themes emerge from the extensive and disparate case law of
the lower federal courts. First, the courts have eschewed systemic
analysis, which ignores fault and focuses on context, 27 in favor of an
individualized concept of misbehavior by correctional staff. As one
court explained, the evidence must show that the "[defendant
personally] knew of ways to reduce the harm but knowingly declined
to act, or that he [personally] knew of ways to reduce the harm but
recklessly declined to act."'
28
Second, at the insistence of the Supreme Court, 9 lower federal
courts have been highly deferential toward prison staff.3 ' They have
122. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
123. See id. at 835-44.
124. See id. at 844-45.
125. See id. at 834 n.3 (acknowledging that the Court had not addressed at "what point
a risk of inmate assault becomes sufficiently substantial for Eighth Amendment
purposes").
126. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal
Courts, and the Nature of "Judicial Power," 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 994 (2000) (footnotes
omitted).
127. For an example of a decision employing systemic analysis, see Alberti v. Heard,
600 F. Supp. 443, 457 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (footnote omitted) (attributing pervasive violence
and sexual activity to multiple sources, including "inadequate staffing levels, inadequate
supervisory techniques, a poor physical design and an unreliable communication system").
128. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1583 (11th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
129. See, e.g., Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) ("[Federal courts ought to
afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile
environment."); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987) ("[A] standard [of deference]
is necessary if 'prison administrators . . . , and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult
judgments concerning institutional operations;'... [w]hen accommodation of an asserted
right will have a significant 'ripple effect' on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts
should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials."
(quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)
(citation omitted))); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-57 (1979) (upholding the random
search of cells out of deference to the realities of prison life). Before Sandin v. Connor,
Justice Blackmun had expressed concern that "careless invocations of 'deference' " might
result in a "judicial blind eye" to deplorable prison conditions. Block v. Rutherford, 468
U.S. 576, 594 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 562).
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renounced what one court called "second guessing the difficult
choices that prison officials must face.'' The court in Lewis v.
Richards3 ' went so far as to posit that "[e]xercising poor judgment...
falls short of meeting the standard of consciously disregarding a
known risk to his safety."'33 Lewis prison staff had denied protective
custody to an inmate targeted by a gang, but they did transfer him to
a different area of the prison.' Five months later, predators made
good on their threats.' In the subsequent legal action, the court
found this modest defensive measure satisfied the Eighth
Amendment.'36
A. Part I: Knowing the Risk
The lower federal courts have identified two avenues by which
defendants acquire knowledge of a significant risk of rape: (1)
specific notice; or (2) awareness of a risk so obvious that one must
have known. An explication follows.
1. Specific Notice
Complaining directly to prison officials remains the most explicit
and accepted manner of establishing actual knowledge.3 7  As the
130. See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Risley, 244 F.3d 209, 213 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[W]here burdens
are laid upon the exercise of constitutional rights by prisoners, the Supreme Court's
current approach is to give very substantial latitude to the state's judgment." (quoting
Beauchamp v. Murphy, 37 F.3d 700, 704 (1st Cir. 1994))); LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d
1526, 1543 (11th Cir. 1993) ("The court should have 'accorded wide-ranging deference in
the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in [the prison officials'] judgment
are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security.' " (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 547)); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d
1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[Plrison administrators 'should be accorded wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment
are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security.' " (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 547)); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1521 n.38
(11th Cir. 1991) ("Where a state penal system is involved, federal courts have ...
additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities." (quoting
Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85)).
131. LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1538.
132. 107 F.3d 549 (7th Cir. 1997).
133. Id. at 554 (citing McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 348 (7th Cir. 1991)).
134. See id. at 553.
135. See id. at 553-54.
136. See id.
137. See, e.g., Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 1998) (ruling that
documents bearing the warden's signature demonstrate his knowledge of the dangers
facing the plaintiff); Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996) ("In failure to protect
cases, '[a] prisoner normally proves actual knowledge of impending harm by showing that
he complained to prison officials about a specific threat to his safety.' " (quoting McGill,
944 F.2d at 349)); Horton v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding deliberate
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court in Pope v. Shafer'3s observed, "A prisoner normally proves
actual knowledge of impending harm by showing that he complained
to prison officials about a specific threat to his safety."'39 Notification
in this manner comes at great risk to a targeted inmate: he becomes a
snitch.40 An inmate's life "isn't worth a nickel" if he reports his rape,
observed Justice Blackmun.' Rapists will typically issue such a
warning at the close of the initial assault.'42 Also, as the plaintiffs'
experts in LaMarca v. Turner43 explained, the reporting process is
itself "degrading and humiliating ... [and] may 'dramatically increase
rather than decrease the risks that [an inmate] will be seen to be
vulnerable people to be raped again.' ,141 Indeed, Eigenberg found
indifference where prison guards had failed to act when the plaintiff informed them of
threats of violence from other prisoners); Williams v. Gersbacker, No. 93-1515, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27694, at *3-*4 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that "in order to establish a
pervasive risk of harm, a prisoner must apprise prison officials of the problem"); McGill v.
Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 349 (7th Cir. 1991) ("A prisoner normally proves actual
knowledge of impending harm by showing that he complained to prison officials about a
specific threat to his safety."); Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1498 (10th Cir.
1990) (stating that the plaintiff's case "would have been stronger if she had been able to
identify the official she allegedly notified of the danger to her husband," who was killed
while serving time in jail); Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 794 (4th Cir. 1987) ("In the
absence of any such specific known risk of harm ... we cannot say that the defendants
violated the eighth amendment by failing to take precautions .... "); Matzker v. Herr, 748
F.2d 1142, 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The prisoner must identify who is threatening him to
allow corrections officers a reasonable opportunity to protect the threatened prisoner
from harm."); Smith v. Ullman, 874 F. Supp. 979, 984 (D. Neb. 1994) (holding that in order
to demonstrate deliberate indifference, an inmate must communicate information to a
prison official).
138. 86 F.3d 90 (7th Cir. 1996).
139. Id. at 92 (quoting McGill, 944 F.2d at 349).
140. See Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 699 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Being labeled a
'snitch' was dreaded, because it could make the inmate a target for other prisoners'
attacks."); Alberti v. Heard, 600 F. Supp. 443, 450 (S.D. Tex. 1984) ("[I]t is apparent that
the inmates have an unwritten code of silence which results in most acts of violence going
undetected."); Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1078 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) ("[T]he
evidence is absolutely clear that the inmate code exists and that it prevents the reporting
of a great many episodes of actual or threatened violence."); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp.
318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976) ("A cardinal precept of the convict subculture is that no inmate
should report another inmate to officials."), affd as modified sub nom. Newman v.
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part and remanded sub nom. Alabama v.
Pugh, 483 U.S. 781 (1978).
141. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 426 n.6 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see
also Gullatte v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1981) (recounting the murder of an
inmate who reported a rape).
142. See Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 160 (1980) ("There is evidence, however, that
many more such [prison sexual] assaults go unreported because the victim is usually
threatened with violence or death should the incident be reported.").
143. 662 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
144. Id. at 686 (internal quotations).
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that 72.9% of correctional officers believed that raped inmates will
not come forward for the reasons delineated above.
Naming one's tormentor, on the other hand, does not create a
right to protective custody housing or other defensive measures
unless the threat can be authenticated. 14' As one court explained:
Certainly a guard does not have to believe to a moral
certainty that one inmate intends to attack another at a
given place at a time certain [sic] before that officer is
obligated to take steps to prevent such an assault. But, on
the other hand, he must have more than a mere suspicion
that an attack will occur.147
For instance, in Turner v. Marshall,4 ' the plaintiff's identification of
his tormentors did not satisfy prison staff. 149 They took no action and
instead sanctioned him when he refused to join the general prison
population.' The trial court ruled against the plaintiff, explaining
that he provided "no corroboration whatsoever as to how he could be
in danger .... Plaintiff [did] not cite a single threat, potential threat
or incident that could warrant fear for his safety..''15.
A party other than the target can apprise prison staff of a
genuine threat to a specific inmate. 2 For example, in Berry v. City of
145. See Eigenberg, supra note 4, at 147.
146. The case law on the authenticity of a threat is largely confined to jail suicide cases.
See, e.g., Bell v. Stigers, 937 F.2d 1340, 1344 (8th Cir. 1991) ("A single off-hand comment
about shooting oneself when no gun is available cannot reasonably constitute a serious
suicide threat."); Estate of Cartwright v. Concord, 618 F. Supp. 722, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(ruling that the circumstances surrounding the deceased's suicide threat, which included
the deceased laughing and joking about committing suicide, relieved jailers of liability),
affid, 856 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 794 (4th Cir.
1987) (ruling that two prior fights did not provide constitutionally adequate notice that an
inmate posed a specific risk of harm); cf. Marsh v. Am, 937 F.2d 1056, 1061 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the prison guard's knowledge of two previous fights among inmates was
insufficient evidence "to raise a jury question as to whether ... [the defendant] had actual
knowledge of genuine, or has [sic] one court put it, a 'specific' risk of harm").
147. Vun Cannon v. Breed, 391 F. Supp. 1371, 1374-75 (N.D. Cal. 1975) ("Certainly a
guard does not have to believe to a moral certainty that one inmate intends to attack
another [inmate] .... But, on the other hand, he must have more than a mere suspicion
that an attack will occur."); see Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986); see
also, e.g., Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(citations omitted) (ruling that deliberate indifference arises when staff do nothing in the
face of more than mere suspicion but less than moral certainty that an assault will occur).
148. No. C-92-1522 EFL, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12594 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 1992).
149. Id. at *5.
150. See id. at *4-*5.
151. Id. at *9.
152. See, e.g., Berry v. Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1498 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding
sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the wife of the deceased informed an
unnamed jail official of the risk); Rossiter v. Andrews, No. 96-6257, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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Muskogee'53 an inmate informed his wife that he feared for his safety
because he had ratted on his crime partners. '  She allegedly told a
jail official, whom she later could not name.' The defendants took
no protective actions, resulting in the death of her husband.'56 She
recovered damages at trial,'57 and on appeal, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that she had provided sufficient credible evidence to
support the jury's verdict.'58
Similarly, prison staff who witness an inmate-on-inmate sexual
assault or hear cries from the victim acquire specific notice.'59 In one
of the earliest cases on point, Benny v. Pipes,"6 the Ninth Circuit
upheld a default judgment against prison staff.'6 ' By alleging that the
defendants "deliberately stood aside" while his fellow inmates
assaulted him, the court stated that the plaintiff had averred the
defendants' actual knowledge regarding his victimization. 62
2. Inferred Notice
Moreover, Farmer held that specific notice would no longer be
required in the face of "an obvious, substantial risk to inmate
safety."'63  In the lexicon of the deliberate indifference test, an
3869, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1997) (refusing to dismiss a suit arising from the defendant's
failure to follow a court order mandating protective custody); Matje v. Leis, 571 F. Supp.
918, 930-31 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (denying a motion for summary judgment because court
officers had warned jailers of the danger of suicide).
153. 900 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir. 1990).
154. See id. at 1497.
155. Id. at 1498 n.14.
156. See id. at 1497-99.
157. Id. at 1500.
158. Id. at 1499.
159. See, e.g., MacKay v. Farnsworth, 48 F.3d 491, 493 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that
prison guards knew that the plaintiff faced a risk of harm because guards had previously
attempted to break up a fight between the plaintiff and another inmate); Walker v. Norris,
917 F.2d 1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that prison guards violated the Eighth
Amendment when they did not intervene in an attack but instead chose to observe);
Serrano v. Gonzalez, 909 F.2d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 1990) (ruling that the officer's presence at an
assault and his failure to intervene violated his duty to protect the plaintiff); Wright v.
Jones, 907 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding the denial of a directed verdict and a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict because there was evidence that prison guards had
knowledge of a previous fight); Arnold v. Jones, 891 F.2d 1370, 1372 (8th Cir. 1989)
(observing that the sound of kitchen equipment being knocked over, the gathering of
inmates, and other commotion alerted staff to a fight in the prison kitchen).
160. 799 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1996).
161. Id. at 494.
162. Id. at 495.
163. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994). Earlier, in Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312 (1986), the Court had indicated that knowledge of the risk "can be inferred"
when an inmate faces a substantial risk of harm. Id. at 321 (quoting Duckworth v. Frazen,
780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985)).
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inferred risk must be "pervasive" to be obvious."4 The requisite
inference arises through the defendant's knowledge of: (1) a high
number of reported assaults; (2) a significant demand for protective
custody housing; or (3) personal attributes correlated with
vulnerability to sexual assault.
a. Reported Assaults
Courts have given considerable weight to reported assaults. In
finding pervasive violence, the court in Tillery v. Owens16' observed
that a Pennsylvania prison averaged ninety-seven assaults per year
amongst roughly 1,800 inmates.16 Yet these figures pale when
compared to the findings of Palmigiano v. Garrahy:167 "155 assaults,
rapes, and major fights per year [among some 650 inmates]; 330 other
incidents of violence, and personal harm to inmates."'" This data and
other evidence led the Palmigiano court to find "ever-prevalent fear
and violence" at a Rhode Island prison. 69 Similarly, the court in
Miller v. Carson'7 described a "daily horror show" at a Florida jail.''
Amid a population of 600 inmates, the court counted more than 150
reported assaults in a period of eleven months.' 2 The court in Gilland
v. Owens"3 discerned at a Tennessee jail an even higher rate of
violence: in a two-month period, 298 violent incidents occurred
among some 2,300 inmates; during the first six months of the year, the
tally reached 685; and for the entire year, twenty-one inmates claimed
that they had been raped.'74
By comparison, the decision in Taylor v. Freeman15 demarked
insufficient assault rates. Amongst a population of about 300
inmates, the plaintiff's data identified "on average one reported
altercation per week (and perhaps only one fight per month in the
164. Andrews v. Siegel, 929 F.2d 1326, 1330 (8th Cir. 1991). The court defined a
pervasive risk as follows: "It is enough that violence and sexual assaults occur ... with
sufficient frequency that prisoners ... are put in reasonable fear for their safety and to
reasonably apprise prison officials of the existence of the problem and the need for
protective measures . I..." d. (quoting Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1984)).
165. 907 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1990).
166. See id. at 422-23.
167. 443 F. Supp. 956, (D.R.I. 1977).
168. Id. at 967.
169. Id. at 968.
170. 401 F. Supp. 835 (M.D. Fla. 1975), affd in part, modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th
Cir. 1977).
171. Id. at 883.
172. See id.
173. 718 F. Supp. 665 (W.D. Tenn. 1989).
174. See id. at 674.
175. 34 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 1994).
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segregated dormitories) and sixty-five arguably serious injuries in
forty-five months."'76  The court found this level of assault
constitutionally acceptable. '77  It reached this conclusion by
constructing a baseline from an earlier ruling in Shrader v. White.'
Over a somewhat longer time frame-sixty months-the Shrader
Court concluded that seven inmate murders, fifty-four stabbings, and
twenty-four serious assaults did not constitute a pervasive risk of
harm.179
Some courts have factored the severity of assaults into their
calculations. In Occoquan v. Barry,'0 the trial court rested its finding
of pervasive violence on an educated guess that the forty serious
incidents reported in the past year represented the tip of the
iceberg.18 1 In Wheeler v. Sullivan,'82 the court took the opposite tack:
it characterized the plaintiffs' tally of 613 incidents reported over a
sixty-two month period as falling short of pervasive.' Wheeler
characterized the incidents labeled as fights and assaults as consistent
with "the use of minimal force.""' Similarly, in Westmoreland v.
Brown 85 the plaintiff's failure to establish "serious or life threatening
186[injury]" undercut an allegation of pervasive violence.
b. Protective Custody Requests
For most inmates, retreating to protective custody represents an
untenable option. A severe stigma attaches to its residents. Other
inmates regard them as weak, the worst of qualities within the prison
subculture,"' or assume they are snitches.' Also, as a prison within a
176. Id. at 273.
177. See id. at 273-74 (vacating the injunction placed on prison officials to enforce
protection).
178. Id. at 273 (citing Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1985)).
179. See Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 980 (4th Cir. 1985) (Sprouse, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
180. 844 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
181. See id. at 831-32.
182. 599 F. Supp. 630 (D. Del. 1984).
183. Id. at 646.
184. Id.
185. 883 *F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1995).
186. Id. at 76.
187. See TOCH, supra note 66, at 224 (recounting the " 'weak' persons (nonmen)"
status accorded inmates in protective custody).
188. See David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1267 (7th Cir. 1988) ("An inmate may
request a transfer to protective custody but is usually somewhat reluctant to do so because
of the stigma attached to such a request. For example, an inmate seeking protective
custody may often be branded as a 'stoolie,' 'wimp' or homosexual by the general
population."); WEISS & FRIAR, supra note 11, at 23-25 (recounting the anxieties of
inmates offered protective custody housing).
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prison, protective custody affords inmates little freedom of
movement, scant programming, and slim prospects for a prison job."'9
The court in Ramos v. Lamm'" observed that the relative size of
the protective custody population represents "one of the most
accurate barometers" of fear.' 9' Protective custody housed eighteen
percent of all inmates, a ratio which became the centerpiece of the
court's finding of rampant violence in the defendants' Colorado
prison." Similarly, the district court in Palmigiano v. Garrahy'93
observed that the protective custody population of a Rhode Island
prison-about one of every five inmates-demonstrated an
"[unacceptable] level of fear and violence."' 94
Moreover, significant relative increases in the protective custody
population evidence pervasive risk. In Jensen v. Clarke, 95 one of the
defendants had previously informed the Nebraska legislature that
"predatory behavior is increasing and weaker inmates are forced to
seek protective custody, which has increased by 70 percent in less
than two years.' 96 Alongside anecdotal information, this increase led
the court to conclude that the plaintiffs faced "a substantial risk of
physical harm."'9
c. Correlated Attributes
An inference of pervasive risk also arises from certain group
attributes correlated with a high likelihood of sexual assault. For
example, the court in Taylor v. Michigan Department of Corrections'98
told of the rape of a youthful looking, mentally retarded inmate,
whose height and weight stood at five feet and 120 pounds
respectively.'99 The defendant warden argued that he had no
knowledge of a threat specific to the plaintiff."° The circuit court in
189. See James E. Robertson, The Constitution in Protective Custody: An Analysis of
the Rights of Protective Custody Inmates, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 125-26 (1987) (describing
the secluded life of protective custody inmates).
190. 485 F. Supp. 122 (D. Col. 1979), afTd in relevant part, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir.
1980).
191. Id. at 141.
192. Id.
193. 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977), affd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1979).
194. Id. at 967 n.12.
195. 94 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1996).
196. Id. at 1199 (citing El Tabech v. Gunter, 922 F. Supp. 244, 261 (D. Neb. 1996)).
197. Jensen, 94 F.3d at 1196-97 (citing Billman v. Indiana Dep't. of Corr., 56 F.3d 785,
788 (7th Cir. 1995)).
198. 69 F.3d 76 (6th Cir. 1995).
199. Id. at 77-78.
200. Id. at 81.
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Taylor concluded that this defense did not apply to cases in which a
plaintiff's physical attributes placed him in a particular high-risk
group.20' "Farmer makes it clear," explained the court, "that the
correct inquiry is whether he had knowledge about a substantial risk
of serious harm to a particular class of persons, not whether he knew
who the particular victim turned out to be."2 2  Hence, the court
remanded the case for further findings of fact.203
Earlier, in Doe v. Lally2° a district court had opined, "[A] fairly
clear cut profile of sexual assault victims in prisons can be made
.... ,,205 The plaintiff in Doe, as well as the aforementioned Taylor, fit
within that profile; small, youthful inmates like themselves often
became victims of prison rape.2°6 These and other attributes often
identify the following as at-risk groups: (1) snitches and other
stigmatized inmates; (2) physically and mentally vulnerable inmates;
and (3) gay and transsexual inmates. An examination of each
category follows.
i. Prison Pariahs
The inmate code condemns snitching. 7 Indeed, as an act of
betrayal,28 it merits assault, sodomy, and even murder.29 In turn,
several courts have ruled that inmates identified as "snitches" face
high risk of harm.2"0  For instance, in Northington v. Marin,2 1 the
201. Id. at 82.
202. Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
203. See id. at 84.
204. 467 F. Supp. 1339 (1979).
205. Id. at 1357.
206. See id. at 1349 (recounting that the typical sexual assault victim is from seventeen
to twenty-three years of age and weighs 125 to 130 pounds).
207. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the condemnation accorded
informers).
208. See SYKES, supra note 36, at 87 (discussing the act of snitching as not merely a
betrayal of one or several inmates, but of inmates in general).
209. See, e.g., MARK COLVIN, THE PENITENTIARY IN CRISIS: FROM
ACCOMMODATION TO RIOT IN NEW MEXICO 186-89 (1992) (describing the gruesome
attacks on informants and other inmates in protective custody during the infamous riot at
the Penitentiary of New Mexico in 1980); SILBERMAN, supra note 23, at 24 (stating that
"when prisoners have taken control of prisons, the first thing they did was to go after
snitches and kill them").
210. Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (observing that a
correctional officer "was aware of the obvious danger associated with a reputation as a
snitch"); Reece v. Groose, 60 F.3d 487, 488 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that being known as a
snitch placed one "at a substantial risk of injury at [other inmates'] hands");
Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that by
labeling an inmate a "snitch" staff intended to subject him to assault by fellow inmates);
Harmon v. Berry, 728 F.2d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding that the
inmate's allegations that staff labeled him a "snitch" and thus exposed him to the threat of
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defendant officer identified the plaintiff as a snitch during a
conversation with inmates.1 2 The plaintiff claimed that fellow
inmates assaulted him upon learning of his alleged transgression.2 3
The court concluded that the defendant must have known that he
placed the plaintiff in "serious jeopardy""2 4 and thus affirmed the
$5,000 judgment for the plaintiff.25
Sex offenders, especially those convicted of victimizing children,
also represent an anathema in the inmate subculture."6 As illustrated
by the facts of Arnold v. County of Nassau,2 7 inmate norms call for
their savage beating. Charged with rape, inmate Arnold soon found
himself in the midst of an "inmate trial.",218 The threatening pack of
inmates announced their verdict by " 'punching [him] and kicking
[him] all over the place.' He thought he was 'going to die.' ,219
ii. The Physically and Mentally Vulnerable
A serious risk of assault can also be inferred for inmates of slight
physical stature. As Human Rights Watch reported,
"Unsurprisingly-given that physical force, or at least the implicit
threat of physical force, is a common element of rape in prison,
victims of rape tend to be smaller and weaker than perpetrators.,
220
The fate of the plaintiff in Young v. Quinlan221 illustrates both the
dangers facing the inmates described above and prison staff's
assault stated a § 1983 cause of action). District courts are in accord. See, e.g., Sims v.
Ballou, No. 94-3300-RDR, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13530, at *5 (D. Kan. Aug. 20, 1997)
("[W]here an inmate has identified a pervasive risk of harm caused by being labeled as an
informant, or alleges a retaliatory motive, he may state a claim for relief."); Ellis v.
Gomez, No. C 93-1360 BAC, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9640, at *5 (N.D. Calif. June 20,
1993) (ruling that "[a] claim that prison staff intentionally spread a rumor that a prisoner
was a 'snitch' may state a claim").
211. 102 F.3d 1564 (10th Cir. 1996).
212. See id. at 1567-68.
213. Id. at 1567.
214. Id.; see also Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding
widespread agreement in the case law that rats place themselves in grave danger); cf. Ellis,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9640, at *5 (ruling that "[a] claim that prison staff intentionally
spread a rumor that a prisoner was a 'snitch' may state a claim").
215. See Northingon, 102 F.3d at 1571.
216. See, e.g., Dennis Giever, Jails, in PRISONS: TODAY AND TOMORROW 414, 448
(Joycelyn M. Pollock ed., 1997) [hereinafter PRISONS] ("[O]ther prisoners will look down
on many sex offenders (especially child molesters) and often will go to great lengths to
injure or even kill them.").
217. 89 F. Supp. 2d 285,303 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
218. Id. at 291.
219. Id.
220. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at IV. Predators and Victims.
221. 960 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1992).
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occasional indifference to their safety. Describing himself as "small,
young, white, and effeminate, 222 the plaintiff complained of sexual
approaches by his cellmate upon entering the institution.22 After staff
relocated him, his new cellmate threatened to kill him unless he
became his "wife. ' 24 Prison officials rejected his repeated requests to
be moved. 25 Four days later, his cellmate held a razor blade to his
throat and forced him to perform fellatio 6.2 2  Attributing the repeated
assaults on the plaintiff to his "youthful appearance and slight
stature," the Third Circuit held that he had averred sufficient facts to
proceed to trial.
Jails and prisons house more mentally ill persons than
hospitals.22 Approximately sixteen percent of the prison population
suffer from mental illnesses. 29  These inmates infrequently receive
treatment,230  and what passes for care is largely custodial.3
Moreover, the pressures of the prison environment can cause mental
deterioration.32  While some mentally ill inmates will become
violent,2 more will lack the wherewithal to avoid exploitation.
222. Id. at 353 n.2.
223. Id. at 353.
224. Id. at 354.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. Id. at 362.
228. See Chris Sigurdson, The Mad, Bad, and Abandoned, CORRECTIONS TODAY,
Dec. 2000, at 70.
229. See, e.g., JAMES AUSTIN & JOHN IRWIN, IT'S ABOUT TIME 104 (3d ed. 2001)
(stating that "an estimated 16% [of prisoners] have some documented mental health
problem"); ALLEN J. BECK & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT
IN STATE PRISONS, 2000, at 3 (2001) (estimating that 16.2% of state inmates are mentally
ill); Sigurdson, supra note 228, at 71 (estimating that 15% of the inmate population suffers
from severe mental illness).
230. See AUSTIN & IRWIN, supra note 229, at 104 tbl.5-2 (indicating that only five
percent receive care). But see BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 229, at 3 (reporting that
seventy-nine percent of mentally ill state inmates receive mental health therapy or
counseling from trained professionals).
231. Marilyn D. McShane, Mentally Ill Prisoners, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
PRISONS, supra note 47, at 320, 324 (citation omitted) ("[P]sychological services were
institutional control wrapped in the 'ceremonial robes of treatment.' ").
232. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1230 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[S]ocial science
and clinical literature have consistently reported that when human beings are subjected to
social isolation and reduced environmental stimulation, they may deteriorate mentally and
in some cases develop psychiatric disturbances.").
233. See Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 560 (1st Cir. 1988)
(stating that "common sense suggests that including schizophrenics or possible
psychopaths, along with others, in a dormitory ... , is a recipe for an explosion, which,
given the other known conditions, could easily lead to someone's death").
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Case law has recognized that many mentally ill inmates face
inordinate danger.235 For instance, the court in Pugh v. Locke236
recounted the sexual assaults inflicted on a severely retarded inmate.
State correctional officials made no special provision for his safety or
that of other disabled prisoners.237 He fell victim to gang rape during
his first night of incarceration in an Alabama prison."' Apparently no
change occurred in his housing status, and two inmates began to
strangle him during the following evening.239 They stopped, but not
mercifully, when they decided to sell him to other inmates for their
sexual enjoyment.24° He did not suffer alone; the court found that
prison conditions throughout Alabama subjected inmates to
"constant fear of violence."24'
iii. Gays and Transsexuals
One can also infer a high risk of rape among gay and transsexual
inmates. Gay inmates confront a prison sexual code that defines
them as "fair game., 242 Expecting little resistance, sexual aggressors
will frequently target gays. In one study, forty-one percent of gay
inmates reported that they had been sexually assaulted, a level triple
that of the institution's overall sexual assault rate. 243  A landmark
study of Philadelphia's jail system found gays "readily available as
male prostitutes... [because of] bribery, persuasion, and the threat of
force. ''14 Equal protection challenges to their segregation245 and/or
234. See Robert Freeman, Management and Administrative Issues, in PRISONS, supra
note 216, at 270, 293 (stating that the mentally ill or handicapped are "often victim[ized]"
in the general prison population and thus require "special handling").
235. See, e.g., Cortes-Quinones, 842 F.2d at 558-60 (faulting defendants for placing a
severely disturbed inmate in the general prison population, where he was killed); Coleman
v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1304-05 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (faulting defendants for failing to
prevent "the obvious risk of harm to mentally ill inmates"); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp.
318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (describing the sexual exploitation of a mentally ill inmate),
affd as modified sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part
and remanded sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 483 U.S. 781 (1978).
236. 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
237. See id. at 324-25.
238. See id. at 325.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 329.
242. WOODEN & PARKER, supra note 4, at 18.
243. See id; see also Struckman-Johnson et al., supra note 4, at 71 (reporting a thirteen
percent overall assault rate in a Midwestern prison).
244. Davis, supra note 65, at 8.
245. See Gay Inmates of Shelby County Jail/Criminal Justice Complex v. Barksdale,
819 F.2d 289, 292 (6th Cir. 1987) (ruling that inmates lack a liberty interest in residing in
the general prison population).
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joint-housing with protective custody inmates have failed.216  While
their ranks may include so-called "aggressive" gays, 47 lower federal
courts have largely seen them as a vulnerable population.
A transsexual inmate also faces a pervasive risk of sexual assault.
The district court in Star v. Gramley219 anticipated Farmer v. Brennan
when it observed that "inmates dressed as females undoubtedly
would require heightened protection. 2 °  The Supreme Court in
Farmer agreed that transsexual inmates should anticipate "a great
deal of sexual pressure." ''
B. Part II: Disregarding a Known Risk
According to the Farmer Court, defendants who know of an
impending rape will escape liability unless they consciously
"disregard[] that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate
it.'252  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has yet to identify the
"reasonable measures" in question.253 Lower federal courts have
filled much of the constitutional void. Their case law provides that a
"known risk" is "disregarded" when staff fail to (1) rescue targeted
inmates; (2) conduct searches for weapons used in rapes; (3) classify
offenders; (4) hire and train prison staff; (5) investigate rapes and
prosecute alleged rapists; (6) and/or marshal defensible space.
246. See Finney v. Mabry, 546 F. Supp. 628, 641 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (stating that housing
a homosexual and protective custody inmates together does not violate the Constitution).
247. See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (disapproving the housing of an "aggressive" homosexual with "young and tender"
inmates).
248: See, e.g., Jensen v. Gunter, 807 F. Supp. 1463, 1474 n.6 (D. Neb. 1992) ("I in no
way mean to imply that homosexual inmates are any more likely than any other inmate to
sexually assault a cellmate; defendants' evidence in this regard was convincing."); Wheeler
v. Sullivan, 599 F. Supp. 630, 651-52 (D. Del. 1984) (finding no deliberate indifference to
an inmate's rape despite the failure to segregate homosexual inmates).
249. 815 F. Supp. 276 (C.D. I11. 993).
250. Id. at 278.
251. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 848 (1994). See generally Debra Sherman
Tedeschi, The Predicament of the Transsexual Prisoner, 5 TEMP. POLIT. & Civ. RTS. L.
REV. 27 (1995) (arguing that prisons for women ought to house male-to-female
transsexuals).
252. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.
253. See Smith v. Norris, 877 F. Supp. 1296, 1298 (E.D. Ark. 1995) ("The Supreme
Court has provided limited guidance in this area, stating only that prison conditions are to
be evaluated under 'evolving standards of decency,' and ... this judgment 'should be
informed by objective factors to the maximum extent possible.' " (quoting Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981))).
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1. Failure to Rescue
The most blatant instances of deliberate indifference arise when
staff witness an inmate-on-inmate assault and fail to respond
promptly.254  Walker v. Norris25  described one instance. A knife-
wielding, intoxicated prisoner charged an inmate-janitor at the
Tennessee State Prison.256 The janitor fled to the prison yard, where
his assailant caught and stabbed him to death as he pleaded to the
defendant officers to rescue him.257 Although the officers had several
opportunities to aid the victim's flight as well as frustrate his
assailant's pursuit, they stood aside.258 Characterizing the defendants'
conduct as "deliberate indifference,, 25 9 the court affirmed the
judgment for the deceased's administratrix.26
Case law directs staff to undertake reasonable but not heroic
measures to rescue inmates from assault.261 For instance, the court in
Solesbee v. Witkowski262 chastised the defendant correctional officers
who stood aside for some three minutes while the nearby assault
continued. 263 The defendants' concern for their own safety qualifies
that duty. Hence, the court in Arnold v. Jones26' held that unarmed
prison officials have no duty to physically intervene in a prison fight
that may cause them serious injury.265
254. See, e.g., Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1453-54 (6th Cir. 1990) (concluding that
officers exhibited deliberate indifference as they watched an inmate being stabbed to
death); Serrano v. Gonzalez, 909 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming judgment for the
plaintiff, who alleged that guards watched inmates assault him but "did nothing to protect
him"); Wright v. Jones, 907 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming judgment for the
plaintiff arising from the defendants' failure to protect him despite the foreseeability of
the assault); Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 495 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding an Eighth
Amendment violation because the defendants "deliberately [stood] aside" while inmates
assaulted the plaintiff).
255. 917 F.2d 1449 (6th Cir. 1990).
256. See id. at 1451.
257. See id. at 1451-52.
258. See id. at 1452.
259. Id. at 1453.
260. See id. at 1454.
261. See Solesbee v. Witkowski, No. 94-6916, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 13283, at *7 (4th
Cir. May 31, 1995) (approving the trial court's jury instruction that correctional officers
must provide "reasonable protection"); Moore v. Winebrenner, 927 F.2d 1312, 1322 (4th
Cir. 1991) ("A heroic effort to insure safety, although perhaps a moral duty, is not a legal
one. But even ordinary unheroic humans, confronted with a known risk of danger to
prisoners, must take specific measures to counter such danger .... ).
262. No. 94-6916, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 13283 (4th Cir. May 31, 1995).
263. See id. at *11-*13.
264. 891 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1989).
265. See id. at 1372.
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2. Failure to Search for Weapons
Prison rapists frequently employ weapons to intimidate or
immobilize victims. 266 For instance, accounts of inmate rape often
portray the assailant holding a knife to the throat of his victim during
intercourse.267  Accordingly, the failure of staff to seize contraband
weapons can show their disregard for prison rape.268  The court in
Tillery v. Owen 269 reached this conclusion upon learning that a host of
weapons-brass rods, knife blades, metal bars, chisels, wrenches,
hammer picks, ice picks, double and single-bladed axes, spikes, razor
blades, and spears-could be found throughout the defendants'
prison."' Inmates had smuggled many out of the prison industry
facility.2 1 A single officer supervised this area.2 In combination with
other adverse prison conditions, the availability of weaponry led the
court to rule that the defendants had breached their constitutional
duty of "good faith protection.,
273
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in LaMarca v. Turner7 found that
"[a]ggression was ... exacerbated by the readily available contraband
and an excessively permissive atmosphere., 27" The court described
sexual assaults involving a bush ax, a baseball bat, and a stabbing
weapon.276  The defendants permitted the free flow of contraband,
including weaponry, into the facility.2 Their laxity contributed to the
court's finding of deliberate indifference to the inmates' safety.
27
266. See, e.g., HASSINE, supra note 7, at 139 (categorizing rapes involving weaponry
and other applications of force as "strong arm rape"); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 4, at V. Rape Scenarios (discussing the use and/or threat of force in prison rapes).
267. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at V. Rape Scenarios (describing
a knife-to-the-throat rape); RIDEAU & WIKBERG, supra note 1, at 73 (describing a knife-
to-the-throat rape).
268. See, e.g., LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1236-38 (11th Cir. 1993) (describing
prison staff as indifferent to the availability of weapons amid unconstitutional levels of
violence); Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that "[e]asy
inmate access to unsupervised machinery and other resources resulted in widespread
possession of weapons" in Louisiana's notorious Angola prison); Tillery v. Owen, 719 F.
Supp. 1256, 1274-75 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (finding ready access to weaponry in a prison beset by
unconstitutional levels of violence).
269. 719 F. Supp. 1256 (W. D. Pa. 1989).
270. See id. at 1276.
271. See id. at 1274.
272. See id.
273. Id. at 1275.
274. 995 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993).
275. Id. at 1533.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 1532.
278. See id. at 1536-38.
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3. Failure to Classify and/or Separate
"[T]he state," wrote the court in Doe v. Lally,279 "should make
every effort to identify likely victims of homosexual assaults early in
the initial classification process."2" Failure to do so, in the presence of
a pervasive risk of harm, constitutes deliberate indifference.281
The court in Redman v. County of San Diego8 2 recounted the ill
effects of defective classification. The defendants celled an inmate
known to be an "aggressive homosexual" with the plaintiff in the
general population. 23 The plaintiff's cellmate repeatedly raped him.2
Jail officials had assumed that general population inmates could
successfully fend off assault-prone inmates.285 They clearly did not
have in mind the plaintiff, a five-foot six-inches tall, 130-pound
youthful male.286  The Redman Court held that the defendants'
deficient classification procedures, coupled with their knowledge of
the cellmates' characteristics and backgrounds, could constitute
deliberate indifference to the safety of the plaintiff.
87
The court in Langston v. Peters288 indicated that only "super
aggressive" inmates represent an undue threat because all inmates
can be considered threatening." A cellmate raped the Langston
plaintiff, who claimed that staff had assured him that he would not
share his cell.2" The plaintiff argued that the staff's failure to inquire
into the disciplinary history of the assailant, who had sexually
assaulted another inmate a year earlier, constituted deliberate
indifference. 9 ' Ruling for the defendants, the court reasoned that
housing the plaintiff with his assailant did not place him at greater
risk than other prospective cellmates.29
279. 467 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Md. 1979).
280. Id. at 1357.
281. See, e.g., Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1584-85 (11th Cir. 1995)
(describing how failure to classify or segregate violent from non-violent inmates violates
the Eighth Amendment); Vosberg v. Solem, 845 F.2d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding no
policy to segregate inmates likely to suffer sexual assault); Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp.
1052, 1124 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (justifying judicial remedy when a defective classification
system deprives inmates of their right to safety).
282. 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991).
283. Id. at 1437.
284. See id. at 1439.
285. See id. at 1444.
286. See id. at 1437.
287. See id. at 1444-48.
288. No. 93 C 2607,1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10985 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 1995).
289. Id. at *27.
290. See id. at *8.
291. See id. at *7.
292. Id. at *24.
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Controversy surrounds the separation of white and black inmates
as a defensive measure against rape. Four noteworthy studies of
prison rape find a predominance of black aggressors and white
victims. Leo Carroll estimated that at least seventy-five percent of
sexual assaults involved black assailants and white victims in a Rhode
Island prison.293 In his study of sexual victimization in three New
York prisons, Daniel Lockwood found that blacks comprised eighty
percent of the aggressors as compared to six percent of white
inmates.2 4  Wooden and Parker reported that non-Hispanic whites
"are much more likely to be 'hit-on' " than other ethnic groups.9
Recently, Human Rights Watch acknowledged the racial imbalance
in sexual targeting.96
The Supreme Court in Lee v. Washington297 barred de jure racial
segregation unless "the necessities of prison security and discipline"
required otherwise.9 8  Accordingly, case law permits temporary
segregation of the races only when other responses have failed and
the need arises from a particularized threat rather than a generalized
concern for safety.299 Nonetheless, prison officials employ surrogate
considerations, such as gang membership or residence, in cell
assignments."°
293. See LEO CARROLL, HACKS, BLACKS AND CONS 182 (1974) (Waveland Press ed.
1988).
294. See LOCKWOOD, supra note 4, at 29.
295. WOODEN & PARKER, supra note 4, at 134-35.
296. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at IV. Predators and Victims.
297. 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam).
298. Id. at 334.
299. See, e.g., Mason v. Schriro, 45 F. Supp. 2d 709, 715 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (forbidding
separation of the races because of lack of "specific evidence of the security dangers that
are implicated"); Stewart v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 1185, 1189 (S.D. Ohio 1979) ("A vague
fear on the part of prison officials that segregation may result in violence is simply not
enough to justify suspension of the fundamental constitutional right [of equal treatment of
the races]."); Mickens v. Winston, 462 F. Supp. 910, 911-12 (E.D. Va. 1978) ("(Prison)
authorities have the right, acting in good faith and in particularized circumstances, to take
into account racial tensions in maintaining security, discipline, and good order in prisons
and jails." (quoting Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, Harlan, and
Stewart, JJ., concurring)), affd, 609 F.2d 508 (4th Cir. 1979); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F.
Supp. 402, 421 (E.D. Okla. 1971) ("Racial segregation of correctional facilities cannot be
justified on the basis that integration may result in inmate violence.").
300. See Leo Carroll, Racial Conflict, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS,
supra note 47, at 377 (discussing the use of "surrogate variables" employed by staff to
separate the races); cf. Wright v. Morris, 811 F. Supp. 341, 343 (S.D. Ohio 1992)
(describing the plaintiff's "strong case" for alleging prison staff engaged in racial
segregation in cell assignments, which the court condemned).
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Inmates often practice voluntary racial and ethnic segregation."'
Lockwood Observed that fear of sexual aggression by blacks led
whites to band together in New York prisons." Whites wexperienced interracial sexual incidents came to hate nonwhites.3 3
4. Failure to Hire and/or Train
Prisons operate as "revolving doors" for correctional officers and
inmates alike. Many officers quit, especially among the ranks of the
most able. °4 The unprecedented growth in the inmate population has
aggravated the chronic shortage of well-trained, experienced
correctional officers.3 5
A host of cases tell of the correlation between shortage of staff
and violence,3 6 such as "severely understaffed" prisons throughout
Texas, allowing predators to "do as they wish .... In the
previously discussed Tillery case, the court concluded that inadequate
numbers of staff contributed to an atmosphere of pervasive
301. See, e.g., HASSINE, supra note 4, at 72 (stating that de facto segregation remains
"very much alive"); JAMES B. JACOBS, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONS AND
IMPRISONMENT 83 (1983) ("[T]here are powerful motivations and strong peer pressures
among the prisoners to segregate themselves."); Carroll, supra note 300, at 378 (discussing
"inmate preferences for self-segregation").
302. LOCKWOOD, supra note 4, at 78 (describing the racially motivated conduct of
white males).
303. See id. at 79 (describing the racial attitudes of white inmates targeted for sexual
assault).
304. See Thomas A. Wright & Dennis A. Sweeney, Turnover [Among Correctional
Officers], in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 47, at 131, 133. The
academic literature presents correctional officers as "alienated, cynical, burned out,
stressed but unable to admit it, suffering from role conflict of every kind, and frustrated
upon imaging [sic]." Susan Philliber, Thy Brother's Keeper: A Review of the Literature on
Correctional Officers, 4 JUST. Q. 9, 9 (1987).
305. See supra note 13 (comparing the prison population in 1980 with that of 1998).
306. See, e.g., Lopez v. Lemaster, 172 F.3d 756, 761 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[J]ailers could do
nothing to prevent attacks ...."); Vosberg v. Solem, 845 F.2d 763, 766-67 (8th Cir. 1988)
("Evidence revealed that one guard attempted to monitor 175 cells on four separate tiers
during the night. Many of these cells housed two prisoners and monitoring rounds were
conducted only every three or four hours."); Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1211 (5th
Cir. 1977) (observing that understaffing contributed to "[e]asy inmate access to
unsupervised machinery and other resources [that] resulted in widespread possession of
weapons"); Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 595 F. Supp. 1558, 1579 (D. Idaho 1984) ("It
is beyond cavil that if the guards are in fear of their own safety [because of understaffing],
the inmates at the institution are perhaps more justifiably afraid."); Feliciano v. Barcelo,
497 F. Supp. 14, 18-32 (D.P.R. 1979) (finding that understaffing made it "difficult to
protect the prisoners"); Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 406 F. Supp. 649, 658 (S.D.
Tex. 1975) (finding that understaffing permitted inmate "goon squads").
307. Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1290-92 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modified, 650 F.2d
555 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in part and rev'd in part, 666 F.2d 854 (5th Cir.), modified, 679
F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982).
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violence."8 No more than seven officers supervised more than 700
inmates in one cellblock.3° Sometimes no one guarded the shower
area.
310
Sexual predators thrive under such circumstances. Raped
inmates have reported that their cries for help went unanswered. "'
"Although correctional staff are generally supposed to make rounds
at fifteen-minute intervals," explained Human Rights Watch, "they
do not always follow this schedule. Moreover, they often walk by
prisoners' cells without making an effort to see what is happening
within them." '
5. Failure to Invesitgate and/or Prosecute
The ruling in LaMarca v. Turner"3 indicates that failure to
investigate a rape may amount to ratification of unconstitutional
conduct and thereby give rise to supervisory liability.3 4 Expert
testimony described the minimum elements of an appropriate prison
rape investigation: "(1) medical evidence should be secured, (2) a full
victim statement should be taken, and (3) the matter should be
referred to a local prosecutor. 3 5  The trial court ruled that the
defendants' failure to follow these procedures, in light of pervasive
violence, demonstrated deliberate indifference.3"6 In affirming the
district court's judgment, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that this omission contributed to "an atmosphere of
tolerance of rape which enhanced the risk that incidents would
occur."317
A persistent failure to refer inmate-on-inmate assaults for
prosecution also implies unacceptable tolerance of prison violence.
The plaintiff in Vosburg v. Solem3 8 had been sexually assaulted on
308. See Tillery v. Owen, 719 F. Supp. 1256, 1275 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at VIII. Deliberate Indifference
("Several inmates have reported to Human Rights Watch that they yelled for help when
they were attacked, to no avail.").
312. Id.
313. 662 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other
grounds, 995 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993).
314. Id. at 658.
315. Id; see also Fisher v. Koehler 718 F. Supp. 1111, 1124-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(requiring prison investigators to complete appropriate training courses).
316. See LaMarca, 662 F. Supp. at 658; see also Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181, 182,
188 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding supervisory liability arising from the absence of "serious"
investigations following inmate assaults).
317. LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1533.
318. 845 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1988).
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four occasions.319 Other young inmates at the South Dakota State
Penitentiary suffered the same fate.2 In the face of what the court
characterized as a pervasive risk, staff failed to refer for prosecution
any of the more than 140 instances of fighting and assaults, including
rape, from 1981 to 1985.321 Moreover, never in the institution's history
had an inmate faced prosecution for institutional rape.322 In contrast,
all suspected criminal acts at the neighboring North Dakota State
Penitentiary had been referred during a similar time frame.323 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that the defendant's
inaction supported a finding of deliberate indifference to the
plaintiff's rape.24
6. Failure to Maximize Defensible Space
Safeguarding inmates requires defensible space, whereby staff
can detect assaults and rapidly aid victims. Ironically, the very layout
325
of many prisons renders their architecture an accessory to rape.
Objectionable structures include shared cells and dormitories, where,
according to inmate-author Victor Hassine, "rapists have their free
pick of victims."326
Case law confirms that living quarters and other unguarded
space invite unconstitutional victimization.3 27  For instance, the
aforementioned Vosberg case described a sexual assault that lasted
forty-five minutes but went undetected.32 The assailant had attacked
319. Id. at 766.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. See id. at 767; see also Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 475 (8th Cir. 1984) (ruling
that failure to report prison assaults to the prosecutor "is in itself relevant evidence of [the
defendant's].. . reckless disregard of the rights of his other prisoners").
325. See Edith Flynn, The Ecology of Prison Violence, in PRISON VIOLENCE 115, 123
(Albert K. Cohen et al. eds., 1976) ("[Prisons are not] particularly [well] designed to
facilitate effective staff intervention, whenever the life and safety of inmates or fellow staff
are endangered.").
326. HASSINE, supra note 7, at 136.
327. See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1995) (refusing to dismiss claim
alleging that double-ceIling led to rapes); LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1532 (11th
Cir. 1993) (describing rapes in dorms, the interior view of which was obstructed); Martin,
742 F.2d at 471 ("A solid, relatively soundproof metal door with a glass window separates
the guards in the rotunda from the inmates in the wings. This door is kept locked. From
the rotunda area, the guards cannot see into the inmate's cells."); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F.
Supp. 2d 855, 918 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (describing a rape in the shower room); Benjamin v.
Malcolm, 564 F. Supp. 668, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (describing three-tiered cell blocks that
prevented the detection of assaults), rev'd on other grounds, 178 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 1999).
328. See Vosberg v. Solem, 845 F.2d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 1988):
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his victim in an unsupervised, darkened room used to develop
photographs.329 The plaintiff's rape represented but one instance in a
reign of terror at the South Dakota State Penitentiary. Inmates
violated fellow prisoners at various locations.330 Not even the guards'
station permitted viewing individual cells.331 Consequently, the court
upheld the jury's award of $10,000 for the plaintiff.33 2
IV. RECONSIDERING THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TEST
The contemporary prison breeds violence unlike any other
institution. When asked to intervene on the part of the weak, lower
federal courts carefully disclaim any warranty of safety.333 "Prisons,"
lamented one district court, "are dangerous places," where "violence
is inevitable [short of sedating inmates]." 33 4 Commentators correctly
describe the prison as a "world of violence,"35  a "walled
battlefield, ". .Hobbesian, 337 and "junglelike. '338
A: They took me to the broom closet and-
Q: In the broom closet or dark room?
A: The dark room, excuse me. And they-we waited there until the people in
the dark room left, which would be approximately a minute.
Q: Did you see any guards up there at that time?
A: No, I did not.
Q: Did you see Mr. Wait around after you gave him your pass?
A: No, I did not.
Q: Then what happened?
A: After everybody else besides me, Mr. Miller and Mr. Brooks, everybody else
left, then Mr. Miller said that he was going to go out and stand jiggers. Mr.
Brooks told me to get-take off my pants and then get into a dog position.
Q: Then what happened?
A: He put lotion on my rectum, shoved his penis in and started slapping me.
Q: How long did that last?
A: Approximately forty-five minutes.
329. See id.
330. See id. at 766.
331. See id.
332. See id. at 765.
333. See, e.g., McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 347 (7th Cir. 1991) ("A prisoner's
interest in safety does not lead to absolute liability, however, any more than the state is the
insurer of medical care for prisoners."); D.R. v. Phyfer, 906 F. Supp. 637, 641 (M.D. Ala.
1995) ("[Tlhe constitutional rights of inmates are [not] violated every time a prisoner is
injured." (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,400 (11th Cir. 1986))).
334. Shaffer v. DeMarco, No. 92-1047, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20632, at *11 (C.D. I11.
April 22, 1994) (quoting Duckworth, 944 F.2d at 348); see also Falls v. Nesbit, 966 F.2d 375,
380 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Prisons are, by the very nature of the persons housed within their
walls, dangerous, violent, and sometimes unpredictable.").
335. SILBERMAN, supra note 23, at 2.
336. Robertson, supra note 16, at 341.
337. Robertson, supra note 23, at 102.
338. ToCH, PRISONS, supra note 23, at 41.
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Shortly before Farmer v. Brennan, the district court in Smith v.
Ullman339 bluntly recommended that "[t]he courts, if ... they are
serious about decrying violence in the nation's prisons, might
reexamin[e] the court-created Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
which tolerates that violence.""34 It urged judges to "reconsider" the
deliberate indifference test because it failed to acknowledge
"environmental factors-including predatory persons in that
environment" as the "driving force" in prison life. 4'
Justice White had rendered a similar assessment in his
concurring opinion in Wilson v. Seiter 2 He too viewed the prison as
a complex social system rather than a collection of discrete
individuals. "[I]nhumane prison conditions," he asserted, "often are
the result of cumulative actions and inactions by numerous officials
inside and outside a prison, sometimes over a long period of time
.... 9343 "In truth," he concluded, "intent simply is not very
meaningful when considering a challenge to an institution, such as a
prison system. The responsibility for subminimal conditions in any
prison inevitably is diffuse. ..."
Justice White's assessment could not be truer of prison rape.
This seemingly bilateral act involving rapist and victim would not
arise but for a cauldron of social action and inaction. The prison
environment threatens the inmate's self-image as a competent, virile
man. As Sykes observed, the "pains of imprisonment"-loss of
liberty, limitations on goods and services, deprivation of heterosexual
relationships, little autonomy, and lack of personal safety345-inflict
339. 874 F. Supp. 979 (D. Neb. 1994).
340. Id. at 986 (emphasis added).
341. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Previously, in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County, 489 U.S. 196 (1989), the Court's dictum had explicitly rejected "the State's [guilty]
knowledge of the individual's predicament" as the basis for the Eighth Amendment duty
to protect custodial populations. Id. at 200. Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion looked to an environmental consideration: their dependence on the state for
"basic human needs---e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety." Id.
(emphasis added). Consequently, he posited that "when the State takes a person into its
custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a
corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being."
Id. at 199-200.
342. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
343. Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
344. Id. (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
345. See SYKES, supra note 36, at 73-78; see also Richard Cloward, Social Control in
the Prison, in PRISON WITHIN SOCIETY 78, 78-79 (Lawrence Haxelrigg ed., 1969)
(describing imprisonment as a "status degradation" process that consigns inmates to a
"lower species") (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
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over time symbolic "castrat[ion]. '346 An inmate learns, however, that
the prison society permits him to regain his manhood through
aggression, domination, and penetration of male inmates.347  Even
prison staff hold in esteem inmates willing to fight, while questioning
the social worth of those who take flight or, worse yet, are cowed into
sexual submission.348 Moreover, prison architecture rarely allows for
effective policing.349
The Wilson Court, however, expressly rejected Justice White's
contention that only the severity of the sanction mattered in
challenges to prison conditions.5  According to Justice Scalia's
majority opinion, punishment-unlike pain per se-constitutes a
"deliberate act intended to chastise or deter."35' Thus, a wanton state-
of-mind by the inflicting prison officers must be established unless the
inflicted pain was "formally meted out [and thus deliberately
administered] as punishment by statute or the sentencing judge." '352
Nonetheless, one can embrace Justice Scalia's analytical model
and still demonstrate that the deliberate indifference test should not
govern prison rape litigation. The debate can be won on his terms by
demonstrating that inmate-on-inmate rape has contaminated our
conception of the prison. For inmates, the body politic, and trial
courts, apprehension of sexual assault represents an integral feature
of a judge's prison sentence. Thus, the rape of a prisoner need not be
attributed to prison officers' wantonness to qualify as cruel and
unusual punishment.
When a judge sentences an offender to prison, what is the
content of that sanction? Because a prison sentence unquestionably
entails the loss of significant liberty,353 we can find guidance in Sandin
346. SYKES, supra note 36, at 70.
347. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing aspects of the prison social
world that equate manhood and aggression).
348. See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text (discussing staff attitudes about
rape).
349. See supra notes 325-32 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of defensible
space in many prisons).
350. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991).
351. Id. at 300 (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985)).
352. See id. (emphasis altered).
353. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1194 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a prison as a
"state or federal facility of confinement for convicted criminals"); FERDICO'S CRIMINAL
LAW AND JUSTICE DICTIONARY 342 (John N. Ferdico ed., 1992) (defining a prison as a
"confinement facility having custodial authority over adults sentenced to confinement for
more than one year") (emphasis omitted); THE DICTIONARY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 244
(George E. Rush ed., 3d ed. 1991) (defining "prison" as a "confinement facility hav[ing]
custodial authority over adults sentenced to confinement").
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v. Conner.354  Prison officials had confined the respondent in
segregation following an alleged rule violation.355 The court of
appeals held that this sanction deprived him of a constitutionally
protected liberty interest.356 In reversing, the Supreme Court in
Sandin identified the residuum of liberty not extinguished by a
sentence of imprisonment.3"7 That residuum, posited Sandin, protects
inmates from deprivations "[exceeding] expected parameters of a
prison sentence." '358  While the Court failed to delineate the
authoritative sources of those expectations, it did acknowledge that a
"prisoner's subjective expectation ... provide[s] some evidence that
the conditions suffered were expected within the contour of the actual
sentence imposed."'359
Inmates view rape as an expected, intrinsic feature of a prison
sentence.36° Accordingly, one question haunts daily life for first-time
inmates: Will I be raped?36 ' For all inmates, "the threat of sexual
assault actually dominates the prison environment and structures
much of everyday interaction that goes on among inmates.13 62 Prison
rape shapes daily life because it threatens every inmate's manhood.363
354. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
355. See id. at 474.
356. See id. at 476-77.
357. Id. at 483.
358. Id. at 485.
359. Id. at 486 n.9 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court stated that expected
parameters of a prison sentence could nonetheless violate inmates' substantive rights. See
id. at 487 n.il.
360. Compare Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) ("Being violently assaulted
in prison is simply not 'part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society.' " (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981))), with HASSINE,
supra note 7, at 134 ("Sexual assaults are so pervasive in correctional facilities today that
they have become unspoken, de facto parts of court-imposed punishments."); see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at L Summary and Recommendations (stating that
"almost any prisoner may become a victim [of rape]").
361. See supra note 11 (citing commentators who proclaim that the fear of being raped
is uppermost in the minds of new inmates).
362. Norman E. Smith & Mary Ellen Batiuk, Sexual Victimization and Inmate Social
Interaction, 69 PRISON J. 29, 30 (1989).
363. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at V. Rape Scenarios ("Through the
act of rape, the victim is redefined as an object of sexual abuse. He has been proven to be
weak, vulnerable, 'female,' in the eyes of other inmates."); id. at V1. Body and Soul: The
Physical and Psychological Injury of Prison Rape (stating the "widespread" view that "at
the very least" the victim has been "proven to be a punk, 'pussy,' or coward by not
preventing" his rape); LOCKWOOD, supra note 4, at 98 (discussing the "socially dislocating
incidents" experienced by prison sexual assault victims, which include being seen as a
"pussy"); SCACCO, supra note 4, at 87 (indicating that rape confers the stigma of
femininity upon the victim); TOCH, supra note 66, at 215 (observing that victims are often
selected because they are seen as having unmanly attributes).
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An intangible, conferred asset, manhood brings status, power, and
dignity in an otherwise demeaning and disempowering
environment.3'6 To maintain one's manhood, no quarter can be
given. In this sexualized social world, distrust and fear of fellow
inmates become the operative principles of daily life. 66 In his seminal
study of sexual victimization, Lockwood characterized the following
comments as typical:
ARE 4: I would live in apprehension [of sexual assault].
Every time I would unlock that door or lock out till the time
I went back in it was constant pressure of watch out for this
man.
ARE 36: Whenever I see him [i.e., a prospective assailant]
around I am consciously aware of it. No matter what I am
doing I have to keep it the back of my mind where he is.
Not that he would try anything out there in the yard or
anything, but the thing is, you never know ... I have alwafys
got it in my mind whenever he is around to be well aware.
For the body politic, prison rape shapes how we talk about and
imagine prison life.368  "Judging by the popular media," wrote one
commentator, "rape is accepted as almost a commonplace of
imprisonment, so much so that when the topic of prison arises, a
364. See, e.g., SYKES, supra note 36, at 76 (arguing that the prison environment
threatens to render the inmate "weak" and "helpless"); WOODEN & PARKER, supra note
4, at 14-15 ("The value structures of the lower-class subcultures found in prison ... place
extreme emphasis on maintaining and safeguarding the inmate's manhood and manliness
... "); Newton, supra note 4, at 198 (discussing how the "ideal of dominance and power"
is equated with masculinity).
365. See, e.g., JACK HENRY ABBOTT, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST 79 (1981) ("If you
are a man, you must either kill or turn the tables on anyone who propositions you with
threats of force. It is the custom ...."); LOCKWOOD, supra note 4, at 52 ("The target's
violent response is an explicit normative expectation of the prison community.");
Robertson, supra note 16, at 346 (observing that "target-initiated violence is the normative
response").
366. See BOWKER, supra note 66, at 1 ("Even in institutions where the rape rate is
relatively low-perhaps averaging no more than a few incidents per year-there is
widespread fear of being raped, and this fear motivates prisoners to defend themselves
carefully against this possibility.").
367. Daniel Lockwood, Issues in Prison Sexual Violence, in PRISON VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 89, 92 (Michael Braswell et al. eds., 1985).
368. Since its inception, the prison has been a potent communicative symbol and
cultural force. See JOHN BENDER, IMAGINING THE PENITENTIARY 11-40 (1987)
(describing the prison as a cultural system and comparing a prison sentence to a novel).
Today, the prison does not represent a symbol of justice; Sherman and Hawkins argued
that for some observers the prison "conjures up unprincipled coercion [and] dehumanizing
treatment." MICHAEL SHERMAN & GORDON HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA 95
(1981).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
joking reference to rape seems almost obligatory." '369 A reporter for
the New York Times expressed a similar conclusion: "Inmate rape
has such an established place in the mythology of prison that
references to confinement often call forth jokes about sexual
assault.""37  An advertisement for the soft drink 7-Up vividly
illustrates how the public accepts prison rape as part and parcel of a
prison sentence.3 ' As prisoners receive cans of the soft drink, an
inmate drops one and remarks that he will not retrieve it, implying
that bending down will expose him to rape.3 72 Later, the soft drink
spokesperson finds himself locked in a cell with an inmate who has his
373
arm around him, implying that a sexual assault will soon commence.
More than twenty years ago, Justice Blackmun put the nation's
judges on notice that "[a] youthful inmate can expect to be subjected
to homosexual gang rape his first night in jail, or, it has been said,
even in the van on the way to jail. Weaker inmates become the
property of stronger prisoners or gangs, who sell the sexual services of
the victim. 3 74 Similarly, case law provides judges with vivid accounts
of the sexual terrorism they perpetuate when imposing prison
sentences. 75 For discerning judges, the readily available literature on
prison rape demonstrates that the inmate subculture continues to
define sexual aggression as a prized masculine trait;376 that the inmate
population still blames the victim by redefining him as a "pussy" or
369. Joanne Mariner, Body and Soul. The Trauma of Prison Rape, in BUILDING
VIOLENCE 125, 126 (John P. May ed., 2000) (emphasis added).
370. Levin, supra note 5.
371. Sabrina Qutb & Lara Stemple, Selling a Soft Drink, Surviving Hard Time. Just
What Part of Prison Rape Do You Find Amusing?, S.F. CHRON., June 9, 2002, available at
http://www.spr.org/ (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
372. See id.
373. See id.; see also, e.g., Brian Carnel, California Attorney General Should Resign
Over Prison Rape Statement, available at http://www.equityfeminism.com/articles/2001/
000077.html) (last visited Oct. 23, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(quoting the Attorney General of California as stating, "I would love to personally escort
Lay [the disgraced head of the bankrupt energy trading company, Enron] to an 8-by-10
cell that he could share with a tattooed dude who says, 'Hi my name is Spike, honey' ");
Lou Moran, Commentary: The Horror of Prison Rape, U.P.I., Feb. 20, 2001, available at
http://www.aegis.com/news/upi/2001/UP010217.html) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (describing prison staff as indifferent to prison rape and also noting "much of the
public seems to tacitly accept the outrage").
374. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 421 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(footnotes omitted).
375. See supra notes 122-332 and accompanying text (reviewing the case law on the
deliberate indifference test); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at VIII.
Deliberate Indifference ("Disappointingly, the federal courts have not played a significant
role in curtailing prisoner-on-prisoner sexual abuse.").
376. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (discussing the subcultural equation
of masculinity with domination).
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"bitch;" 377 and that a blind eye remains the preferred response to rape
among some prison officers.378
The "evolving standards of decency," the lodestar of the Eighth
Amendment since Trop v. Dulles,379 beckon when courts are freed
from the dead hand of the deliberate indifference test. Because the
Army has historically served as a model for the administration of
prisons, 38 its policy of "zero tolerance" toward sexual assault18 and
sexual harassment3 82  should be presumptive of corresponding
standards of decency in prison. For inmates and custody staff, "zero
tolerance" begins with "normalization": "A male inmate is not to be
accepted as a female surrogate in any sense .... ,38 For wardens,
"zero tolerance" requires a host of measures to safeguard all inmates.
They include: (1) training programs about prison sexual violence for
staff and inmates; (2) sufficient numbers of officers for policing
inmates; (3) procedures for the apprehension of alleged inmate
rapists and their referral for criminal prosecution; (4) classification
systems for separating vulnerable and aggressive inmates from the
377. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1203 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Once raped,
an inmate is marked as a victim and is subsequently vulnerable to repeated violation. The
victims of these attacks are frequently called female names and terms indicative of gender
animus like 'pussy' and 'bitch' during the assaults and thereafter."); see also supra notes
28-31 and accompanying text (describing the social reconstruction of the rape victim).
378. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (discussing staff's view of rape as a
means for deterring, punishing, and managing inmates).
379. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
380. See Marilyn D. McShane & Frank D. Williams III, Management [of Prisons], in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 47, at 4, 5 ("The prison resembled a
paramilitary organization, using rank as authority .... ). The paramilitary "boot camp"
for inmates is but one example of the Army's continuing influence on prisons. See Doris
Layton MacKenzie, Boot Camps, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note
47, at 61 (stating that the first prison boot camps "were modeled after military boot
camps").
381. See Madeling Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture, 45
DUKE L.J. 651, 678 (1996) (stating that after 1991 "the services publicized 'zero tolerance'
policies regarding sexual assault").
382. See Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and
the Military, 83 MINN. L. REV. 305 passim (1998) (critiquing the military's policy of "zero
tolerance"). "Zero tolerance" in adult/juvenile statutory rape may also be at hand. Cf
Elizabeth Hollenberg, The Criminalization of Teenage Sex: Statutory Rape and the Politics
of Teenage Motherhood, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 268 (1999) ("Politicians in a
number of states, including California, advocated the revival and revision of statutory rape
laws, to send a clear message of zero tolerance for adult-teenage relationships through the
aggressive prosecution of statutory rape." (internal quotation marks and footnote
omitted)).
383. Peter L. Nacci & Thomas R. Kane, Sex and Sexual Aggression in Federal Prisons,
48 FED. PROBATION 46, 51 (1984).
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general population; (5) and easily monitored living quarters so as to
deter and detect sexual assaults.3"
For federal courts, "zero tolerance" requires abandonment of the
deliberate indifference test. A presumption of liability should lie
against prison wardens whenever a plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case of rape. Unless defendant wardens demonstrate that they had
employed the full range of countermeasures,386 injunctive relief and/or
damages should be awarded. "A clean heart and an empty head"
should no longer pass constitutional muster.
ROBERT BRIDGEN AS EPILOGUE
The sad fate of Robert Bridgen reminds us of the irony
surrounding the deliberate indifference test. Conceived as a
guarantee of access by inmates to medical staff,387 the test sometimes
results in blaming victims for their injuries, including their own
murder. Prison staff had moved inmate Brigden, a sex offender, from
the general prison population to protective custody after inmates
assaulted him.3 8 Later, with the elimination of the protective custody
unit, he rejoined the general prison population.3 89  There he
complained of a robbery and harassment but refused transfer to
another prison's protective custody unit." Shortly thereafter, an
inmate murdered him.39'
The plaintiff argued that the defendants knew Brigden faced
danger.3 2 The court concluded otherwise. It reasoned that Brigden's
two-year imprisonment rendered him knowledgeable of the risks of
confinement, which he assumed through his refusal to enter
384. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at I. Summary and Recommendations.
385. Supervisory liability does not require a finding of liability on the part of the
subordinates in question. See Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., The Constitutional Implications of
High-Speed Police Pursuits Under a Substantive Due Process Analysis: Homeward
Through the Haze, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 599, 644 n.178 (1997) (citing cases in support of
this proposition). Plaintiffs, however, must demonstrate the supervisor's "direct
responsibility" for the subordinate's conduct. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-
77 (1976) (establishing the "direct responsibility" requirement).
386. See supra note 384 and accompanying text (delineating anti-rape measures). But
see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543 n.27 (1979) (stating that model standards "may be
instructive in certain cases" but "do not establish the constitutional minima").
387. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97 (1976)).
388. Brigden v. Okla. Dep't of Corr., No. 96-6339, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29876, at *84
(10th Cir. Apr. 29,1997).
389. See id. at *5.
390. See id. at *8-*9.
391. See id. at *9.
392. See id. at *10.
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protective custody.3 93 The court did not take issue with the Hobson's
choice given the deceased: either face the dangers of the general
population or the stigma and hardships of protective custody.3 94 He
had no place to hide, and the deliberate indifference test denied him
constitutional refuge.
393. See id. at *19-*20.
394. See supra notes 187-88 (discussing the lowly status accorded inmates housed in
protective custody).
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